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To the Truth 
To all the days I have struggled to find it,  
To all the days I have been and will be struggling to live according to it, 
And to those who have been affected by my non-truthful communications. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, I investigate how social interactions stimulate non-truthful 
management of self-threatening information and the consequences thereof. The first chapter 
focuses on interpersonal consumer communication in situations that involve social disparity and 
how moral emotions such as embarrassment, guilt, or shame underlie the behavior.!!While!deception has been examined extensively as a consumer response to requests for self-threatening 
information, we theorize and demonstrate that evasion is a distinct, often preferred behavioral 
response to the same goal. Through four studies, I show that although evasion and deception are 
both driven by anticipated embarrassment, the behaviors have different antecedents and 
emotional consequences. I find that consumers employ evasion (non-answer) more than 
deception (false answer) potentially to decrease the extent to which they experience guilt and 
shame for their dishonest behavior. While deception (but not evasion) avoidance is driven by the 
risk of being exposed by an informed other, evasion (but not deception) avoidance is driven by 
the risk of exposure to a persistent other. Overall, I find evidence that evasion is a distinct, and 
potentially more common response to self-threatening information exchanges than deception, 
suggesting that while consumers may not be biased by profit motives, the information they share 
about their consumption experiences can be contaminated by other distortions that limit its 
usefulness to consumers. 
The second chapter of the dissertation delves into consequences of non-truthful 
communication tactics. I examine the social consequences of evasive and deceptive tactics in a 
!xi 
consumption setting for which communicational missteps may have economic consequences: a 
waitperson-customer interaction. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which the information-
sharing tactics (i.e., evasion or deception) favored by the waitperson (i.e., communicator) may or 
may not be consistent with those most likely to be rewarded by the customer. I argue that 
although the communicator may be more motivated to favor evasion over deception as in 
Chapter 1, the audience might not respond as favorably to evasion, as it lacks informativeness 
and believability. The negative impact of paradoxical social consequence is mitigated when the 
further information search leads to the moral consideration of other-(vs. self-) benefitting motive 
of the non-truthful communication. 
Overall, this dissertation builds upon the literature on consumer morality and 
interpersonal communication by pursuing a rigorous examination of a less than truthful 
information sharing tactics that have received limited attention in the literature. 
 
-==2----. 
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INTRODUCTION 
People share their thoughts, feelings, values, experiences, and facts to other people. 
People seek information from others in hopes to navigate through their decision-making 
processes more smoothly in everyday life. More freely people share and receive information via 
internet-mediated platforms, and some watchfully call this age ‘the era of information overload.’ 
Not only has information grown in amount to an overwhelming extent, but also the accuracy of 
information has been threatened. Let alone the general anonymity of the web space fueling the 
decline of veracity from many information exchanges, a variety of factors may result in non-
truthful information exchange. While consumers automatically discount the trustworthiness of 
firm sources of product information (Main, Dahl, & Darke, 2007) due to their profit motives, 
information coming from other consumers might also be distorted due to their self-presentational 
motives (Barasch and Berger 2013; Packard and Wooten 2013) or need for uniqueness (Cheema 
& Kaikati, 2010). 
This dissertation recognizes the importance of information to consumers: how it shapes 
consumers’ knowledge structures, perspectives, perceptions, and ways in which consumers make 
purchase and resource allocation decisions. Moreover, how consumers evaluate and/or enjoy 
their consumption experiences may be malleable depending on what information they have. This 
dissertation also acknowledges that the information consumers acquire through various social 
interactions around their consumption experiences may not reflect the true reality. Therefore, this 
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dissertation devotes deliberate attention to instances of non-truthful information exchange that 
arise in consumption settings.   
Particularly, this dissertation investigates a specific type of information sharing that often 
involves a form of self-presentation. That is, information can be shared to others arguably as a 
medium to present one’s self in a favorable light. In other cases, however, sharing information as 
is might be undesirable to consumers when others having the information might reflect 
negatively on the self. This presents challenges to individuals who must effectively manage 
disclosure of information to achieve their self-presentational goals. In other words, when a piece 
of information does not align well with your self-presentational goal, it may not be obvious how 
to best handle it. Consequently, interpersonal communications often comprise false information, 
and other instances of communication involve withholding information to only partially reflect 
the reality. Antecedents and consequences, along with demonstrations of such non-truthful 
information sharing are discussed in this dissertation.  
Extant research on non-truthful communication has focused primarily on deception, and 
has found that individuals are sometimes willing to lie to achieve gains or to avoid losses 
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Consumer researchers have also shown 
that consumers lie to service providers to attain financial gains (Andrade & Ho, 2009; Anthony 
& Cowley, 2012). Moreover, Goffman (1955)’s suggestion that all participants in social 
interactions are engaged in certain practices to avoid being embarrassed has motivated consumer 
research to examine the theoretical explanations to describe the precursors to interpersonal 
deception in terms of impression management (Sengupta, Dahl, & Gorn, 2002) and social 
comparison (Argo, White, & Dahl, 2006). Yet, while deception is extensively documented as a 
strategic communication tactic often used to attain consumer goals in social interactions, less 
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effort has been devoted to understanding of the downstream consequences of managing 
information in such a way. Only recently has consumer literature started to recognize that there 
exists an “acceptable range of dishonesty” (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Insofar as the notion 
alludes to the existence of unacceptable consequences of the dishonest information managing, an 
investigation of an alternative to deception in handling unfavorable information is justified. 
Two chapters of this dissertation attempts to fill this gap to explain a commonly 
occurring yet overlooked phenomenon, i.e., evasive communication among individuals, on the 
basis of the self-presentation literature. Evasion, which refers to providing ambiguous, vague, 
and/or irrelevant information or being avoidant, has been suggested by communications 
researchers as a means to which deceptive communicators can resort in order to avoid getting 
caught in a deception (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 1994; Carlson, George, Burgoon, 
Adams, & White, 2004) and more recently, as an appealing strategy a salesperson can use by 
consumer researchers (obfuscation; Bickart, Morrin, & Ratneshwar, 2015). With a primary goal 
of empirically establishing evasion as an alternative to deception, I extend literature on deceptive 
self-presentation. Specifically, I examine self-presentational motives that underlie social 
interactions (e.g., to avoid being in the short end of social comparison, Chapter 1; to maximize 
economic compensation gained through self-presentation, Chapter 2) and how those motives can 
stimulate dishonest and fragmentary communication of information. I further consider 
downstream consequences of both of the non-truthful communication tactics, in hopes to achieve 
a more thorough and comprehensive analysis of information management tactics that individuals 
can employ to fare well in social situations that involve unfavorable information. 
More specifically, I comparatively examine two different maneuvers of non-truthful 
information management, evasion and deception, to document when, why, and how individuals 
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engage in such information sharing that is less than truthful. In doing so, I show that evasion is a 
distinct and often-preferred alternative to deception. An examination of consequences follows, 
first by attempting to understand emotional outcomes of engaging in the non-truthful 
communications to further support discriminant validity between deception and evasion, and 
second in search of implications to social interactions that may involve economic effects. I focus 
the scope of social interaction to face-to-face interactions in this dissertation to uncover the 
utilizing of untruthful communications in a context that requires immediate self-presentational 
efforts. For greater generalizability, I test my theoretical arguments with regards to the aspects of 
non-truthful communications in two different consumption contexts: consumer-to-consumer 
communication and waitperson-customer interaction. 
A list of specific questions I address in this dissertation is presented below: 
1. What communication tactics do individuals employ in social interactions that potentially 
involve disclosure of information that might reflect unfavorably to the self? 
1.1. Is deception a common means?  
1.2. Is evasion a unique and viable alternative to deception? 
1.3. Which tactic is generally more preferred? 
2. What (emotional) aspect(s) about the information drives individuals to engage in deception 
and/or evasion? Does the anticipation of ‘feeling embarrassed’ underlie the process? 
3. What are emotional outcomes of deception and evasion? Do deception and evasion result in 
different levels of emotional consequences? 
4. Can the tendency to use deception or evasion be moderated? What situational factors affect 
consumer’s willingness to be deceptive vs. evasive? 
5. What are some social consequences of engaging in deception vs. evasion?  
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5.1. Which of the tactics is more welcomed by the recipient? 
5.2. How do the differences in perceived believability and perceived informativeness 
affect the recipient’s further information search behavior?  
5.3. Do the recipients view the two tactics equally negatively? Do the two tactics evoke 
differential responses from the recipients once they receive truthful information? 
6. What communication tactics do individuals employ in social interactions that potentially 
involve disclosure of information that might reflect unfavorably to a 3rd party? 
6.1. Is evasion a common means of avoid disclosing a inconvenient truth that might 
reflect negatively on other person?  
6.2. How do the recipients respond to non-truthful communications with other-benefitting 
(vs. self-interested) motives? 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation, in a series of laboratory experiments, seeks to 
answer questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 by investigating a series of face-to-face interactions between two 
individuals that involve social comparison in their performances as consumers. The second 
chapter is intended to revisit some of the questions examined in the first chapter and to extend 
the findings taken from consumer-to-consumer communication to another domain of 
interpersonal communication (i.e., service provider – customer interaction). Furthermore, the 
second chapter delves into the downstream socio-economic consequences of evasion and 
deception (Q5), mainly focusing on how the recipients of those communications would respond. 
Two dimensions of non-truthful communications, (i) ambiguity of the information (lack of 
informativeness) and (ii) untruthfulness of the information (lack of believability), were examined 
in terms of their influences on the recipient’s subsequent decision-making. Finally, I test the 
   6 
possibility of negativity of non-truthful nature of the communication being overridden if other-
benefitting (vs. self-serving) motives underlie those communications (Q6).  
In sum, the two chapters in this dissertation together seek to provide scientific 
understanding of evasion and deception within interpersonal communications. I demonstrate how 
individuals manage information flow within the meaningful intersection of self-presentation and 
morality. Furthermore, the two chapters explain what emotional aspects are accompanied with 
the non-truthful communications, and also present the downstream consequences of those 
communications. With this intellectual endeavor as a whole, I intend to contribute to continued 
effort in the Marketing field (1) to promote consumer welfare by providing insights that would 
improve the quality of communications outcomes within various social contexts that consumers 
engage in, and (2) to inform firms and service providers with a better understanding of the 
dynamics of communications with and among consumers to help them establish and maintain 
more solid relationships with consumers.  
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CHAPTER I 
Beyond Truth and Lies: Evasion as an Alternative to Deception  
to Manage Unfavorable Consumption Information 
 
Consumers participate in a variety of conversations that not only influence prospective 
purchases, but also facilitate evaluations of past purchases. In the process of such evaluations of 
past or potential purchases, consumer-generated information is viewed as trustworthier and more 
likely to be driven by altruistic as opposed to self-interested motives (Bickart and Schindler 
2001). Relatively speaking, the trustworthiness of commercial messages is often discounted as a 
consequence of persuasion knowledge (Friestad and Wright 1994). 
While consumers often express skepticism about firm sources of product information 
(Main, Dahl and Darke 2007), they might also have cause to question the quality of information 
provided by fellow consumers. A growing body of evidence suggests consumers try to present 
themselves in a favorable light to others in consumer-to-consumer communication (cf. Berger 
2014 review). Such efforts can potentially impact the information they share with others and the 
audience with whom they share these messages (Barasch and Berger 2013; Packard and Wooten 
2013), especially when the interaction entails social comparison. For example, consumers are 
willing to deceive others to avoid sharing information that reflects unfavorably upon them 
(Anthony and Cowley 2012; Argo, Dahl and White 2011; Argo and Shiv 2012; Argo, White, and 
Dahl 2006; Mazar, On and Ariely 2008; Sengupta, Dahl, and Gorn 2002).  
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Although considerable attention has been paid to the use of deception in consumer-to-
consumer communication contexts as one of the most common ways people manage the 
unflattering consumption information, some studies have reported levels of lying intentions that 
suggest consumers generally are reluctant to lie to each other. For example, across four studies 
presented by Argo, White, and Dahl (2006), the mean score on the lying index exceeded the 
scale midpoint in only two of 16 experimental conditions. That is, on average, participants 
reported being unlikely to deceive. If these participants were being honest about their lying 
intentions, then how else might they respond to requests for information that may not reflect 
favorably upon them? 
 
“You don’t tell deliberate lies, but sometimes, you have to be evasive.”   
      - Margaret Thatcher, 1976 - 
 
 Prime Minister Thatcher’s comment about the need to be evasive suggests a plausible 
answer to this question. Evasiveness, defined as the avoidance of a clear and direct answer to a 
question (Merriam-Webster 2012), has been proposed as a non-obvious alternative to 
authenticity or deception (Leary 1995), a probable response to concerns about unfavorable self-
presentations (Wooten and Reed 2000), and an effective approach to handling difficult questions, 
especially when audiences devote relatively more attention to the speaker than to the message 
(Rogers and Norton 2011). More recently, consumer researchers have extended their efforts in 
examining the outcomes of evasive communication to find an ‘obfuscating salesperson’ may 
effectively increase the prospects of a sale depending on factors that affect trust perceptions of 
the salesperson (Bickart, Morrin, and Ratneshwar 2015). 
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In the present chapter, we attempt to advance understanding of evasion as a tactic used to 
manage disclosures of consumption information when communicating truthfully could present 
threat to the self in an interaction. Although scholars have devoted considerable attention to 
deception as one means of avoiding the truth, evasion represents a largely unexamined means of 
achieving a similar end. In this research, we conduct four experiments to: (1) assess people’s 
tendencies to evade rather than deceive as a means of avoiding the truth about their consumption 
outcomes, (2) examine differences between evasion and deception by exploring psychological 
consequences of evasion versus deception and factors that differentially affect consumers’ 
intentions to evade versus deceive.  
Before presenting our experiments, we provide a conceptual foundation to support: (1) 
the proposed distinction between evasion and deception, (2) shame and guilt as psychological 
consequences of deception more so than of evasion, (3) the threat of embarrassment as a driver 
of intentions to evade or deceive, and (4) discreditability and persistence as unique moderators of 
intentions to deceive and evade, respectively. 
 
1.1 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
1.1.1 Evasion as an Alternative to Deception 
Despite considerable interest in consumer lying (Anthony and Cowley 2012; Argo, Dahl 
and White 2011; Argo and Shiv 2012; Argo et al. 2006; Mazar et al. 2008; Sengupta et al. 2002), 
our understanding of how consumers avoid truthful disclosures of consumption information 
remains limited. Scholars often define deception following DePaulo’s seminal paper on lying 
(DePaulo et al. 1996, 980) as, “the deliberate fostering of a false impression rather than the 
judicious editing of a true one.”  
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We offer that this definition of deception implies a third category: one in which people 
can avoid telling the truth without telling a lie. It further implies that the so-called “lie of 
omission” may be a misnomer, because the “judicious editing” of truthful information does not 
constitute deception at all. Instead, such responses appear to fit under a broader category of 
evasive behaviors that include providing a vague or ambiguous response, clamming up, dodging 
questions or changing the subject (Rogers and Norton 2011; Schlenker and Weigold 1989; 
Wooten and Reed 2000). 
In contrast to DePaulo’s definition, some scholars have conceptualized half-truths as 
whole lies, particularly if the communicator intends to deceive (Ekman 1985) or has the potential 
to “profit from lies without, technically, telling lies” (Goffman 1959, 62). Kirmani and Campbell 
(2004) similarly lumped withholding or concealing consumer information together with 
deception as a consumer tactic in managing interactions with salespeople. With this more 
expansive view of deception, many responses for which any pertinent fact is omitted can 
potentially be viewed as “lies of omission,” particularly if the communicator intended to 
introduce false inferences by this omission or the audience was in fact actually misled. 
Regardless of whether one favors the more restrictive definition or a more expansive one, 
there remains a category of responses that do not reveal the truth, yet also do not involve either 
deceptive intent by the communicator or deceptive inferences by the audience. The congressional 
testimony of General Motors CEO, Mary Barra, provides a recent case in point. In response to 
multiple questions about her company’s mishandling of the problems created by defective 
ignition switches in many GM vehicles, Ms. Barra indicated that the company was investigating 
the matter. That is, instead of providing a direct answer containing the most relevant facts or 
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(assuming an investigation is actually in process) providing false or misleading information, she 
gave “non-answers” to many questions. 
The present research seeks to establish this type of evasive behavior as an alternative to 
deception when the truth is an unattractive option. Although the scope of evasion and its 
relationship to “lies of omission” have depended on whether one favors a restrictive or expansive 
definition of deception, we propose that evasion is a distinct response alternative that is likely to 
have different antecedents and consequences than deception. 
In the present research, we seek to establish evasion as a distinct behavioral response to 
potential disclosures of self-threatening information, with different antecedents and 
consequences than deception. Surprisingly, empirical examination of when and why people are 
evasive in social interactions is scant. In two unpublished manuscripts, Leary and his students 
found that people avoid revealing information about themselves when their self-concepts are 
inconsistent with personal attributes valued by their conversation partners (Lamphere and Leary 
1988; Spivey and Leary 1990). That is, study participants were less likely to voluntarily provide 
self-relevant information when their traits (e.g., introversion or light-heartedness) did not match 
their conversation partners’ preferences (e.g., extroversion or seriousness). While withholding 
information about undesired traits (a non-answer) is qualitatively different than falsely claiming 
exaggerated levels of desired traits (a deceptive answer), the two approaches reflect distinct 
means of achieving similar ends – avoiding the disclosure of truthful information. 
Whereas Leary and colleagues explored the tendencies of people to give evasive 
responses, Rogers and Norton (2011) considered the perspectives of listeners who receive them. 
They found that people can fail to detect a political speaker’s efforts to dodge questions, 
especially when the speaker gives answers to closely related questions or when listeners focus 
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more on the speaker than the message. Moreover, ‘artful dodgers’ who answer tangentially-
related questions in a fluent manner are rated more positively than those who answer the actual 
question, but do so less fluently. Similarly, Bickart et al. (2015) defined obfuscation as a 
response to a question that “(a) does not directly answer the question; (b) is intentionally vague 
and unclear; and (c) impedes the target’s ability to obtain desired information.” They examined 
obfuscation by salespeople, finding that under certain conditions, it represents a potentially 
advantageous selling approach.  Taken together, this works suggest there may be some 
psychosocial advantages to evasion for the speaker.  
In summary, people actively manage the information they reveal about themselves, 
especially information that presents them in an unfavorable light (Argo et al. 2006). Although 
deception is a well-documented means of managing the flow of self-threatening information, 
including information about consumer performance disparities (Argo et al. 2006, 2011; Sengupta 
et al. 2002), evasion is a less obvious means to a similar end (Leary 1995). However, neither 
consumer researchers nor social psychologists have devoted much attention to examining 
evasion as an alternative to deception or truthfulness, the potentially different psychological 
consequences of these behaviors, the psychological mechanisms linked to evasion and deception, 
and the moderators of intentions to evade rather than deceive. The present research seeks to fill 
these gaps by highlighting how evasion is distinct from deception as well as truthful 
communication. 
 
1.1.2 Emotional Consequences of Evasion versus Deception 
We seek support for our proposed distinction between evasion and deception by 
exploring consumers’ emotional responses to employing each tactic. Recent efforts to understand 
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consequences of truth avoidance (e.g., Anthony and Cowley 2012; Argo and Shiv 2012) have 
focused primarily on its financial and behavioral consequences and exclusively on deception. In 
the present research, we seek initial support for our proposed distinction between evasion and 
deception by exploring consumers’ emotional responses to employing each tactic. Specifically, 
we examine differences in negative self-conscious affect (i.e., guilt and shame) as a result of 
deceiving versus evading. 
Because people typically value honesty, deception is a potential affront to one’s 
perceptions of morality (Bok 2011) and self-concept maintenance (Mazar et al. 2008). As a result, 
people have reported feelings of tension, guilt or anxiety during the act of lying (Caso et al. 2005; 
Ekman and Frank 1993; Vrij et al. 1996). Such feelings are driven in part by the fear of 
deception detection—being caught in a lie (Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal 1981). The fear 
of deception detection has also been associated with feelings of shame (Keltner and Buswell 
1996). However, the psychological consequences of deception likely extend beyond the fear of 
being caught in a lie. When deception is self-interested and therefore a moral transgression, 
(Mazar et al. 2008), guilt and shame can arise as a result of the blow to one’s self-concept 
associated with being a liar (Ekman and Frank 1993).  
Guilt and shame are described as “close cousins” in the family of negative self-conscious 
affect, with guilt and shame being the private and public manifestations of this affect, 
respectively (Ekman 1985; Tangney et al. 2006). Both emotions are significantly more aversive 
than the feelings associated with revealing an embarrassing truth (Tangney et al. 1996) in that 
they reflect a more serious personal flaw or moral transgression (Buss 1980; Lewis 1992). 
Accordingly, we expect feelings of shame and guilt to be prevalent among those who deceive. In 
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contrast, these feelings should be less prevalent among those who evade because evasion allows 
individuals to avoid the moral transgression associated with sharing false information. 
  
1.1.3 Evasion and Deception as Protective Responses to Anticipated Embarrassment 
In his classic analysis of face-work, defined as the actions people take to navigate 
situations with self-threatening implications, Goffman (1959) posits that the norm of self-respect 
requires individuals to go to certain lengths to protect themselves from threats to their situated 
identities. Argo et al.’s (2006) finding that victims of unfavorable social comparisons are willing 
to lie about the prices they paid to protect themselves from the threat of being “taken” is 
consistent with Goffman’s analysis. In Goffman’s parlance, Argo and colleagues found that self-
respecting consumers are willing to deceive others in order to save face. Although they did not 
conduct formal tests of mediation, Argo et al.’s discussion of unfavorable social comparisons as 
threats to public self-images suggests embarrassment as a possible mediator of the effect of 
consumer performance disparities on individuals’ intentions to lie about their consumption 
outcomes.  
Self-presentation theorists have described embarrassment as a reactive response to social 
predicaments (Leary and Kowalski 1995). That is, people feel embarrassed after presenting 
themselves unfavorably to others (Ekman 1985; Miller 1995). However, because it is an aversive 
state (Leary 1995; Miller 1992), embarrassment also serves an important regulatory function that 
is essential for orderly social interaction and social well-being (Goffman 1963). The fear of 
embarrassment motivates people to keep their behaviors within the limits of propriety and to 
withhold information that threatens their public self-images (Leary and Kowalski 1995). The 
notion that desires to avoid embarrassment can influence future behaviors suggests that 
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embarrassment can be anticipatory as well as reactive. If people can feel embarrassed for others 
(Miller 1987, 1992; Stocks et al. 2011), then they should be able to feel embarrassed for future 
selves (Tangney et al. 1996; Verbeke and Bagozzi 2003), and respond accordingly.  
We, therefore, propose embarrassment as a mediator of the effect of unfavorable 
performance disparities on consumers’ intentions to provide both evasive and deceptive 
responses to requests for information about performance outcomes. 
 
1.1.4 Differential Drivers of Evasive versus Deceptive Communication 
While we predict that evasion and deception arise out of a similar need—the anticipated 
embarrassment of disclosing self-threatening consumption information—the strategies people 
use to present themselves to others are often influenced by characteristics of the situation and 
audience at hand. For instance, people present themselves differently to psychologically close 
than to psychologically distant audiences (Argo et al. 2006, study 3; Tesser and Campbell 1982). 
Moreover, actors’ self-presentations are sometimes constrained by what their audiences know 
about them (Baumeister and Jones 1978).  
To support our conceptualization of evasion and deception as distinct behaviors, we 
examine how factors pertaining to the information being exchanged would drive evasion 
independently of deception. Specifically, we discuss disinformation and non-information as two 
situated risks that should differentially drive intentions to evade and deceive, respectively. 
In the present research, we consider how an audience member’s possession of relevant 
information about the actor (discreditability) and how an audience member’s motivation to 
obtain the information (persistence) differentially affect the use of evasion and deception in 
response to requests for information that could reveal the outcome of an unfavorable 
17 
 
performance disparity. Our primary purpose for examining these two moderators is to provide 
further evidence that evasion and deception are conceptually distinct behavioral strategies likely 
to be employed under different circumstances. 
Discreditability. The more difficult it is for an audience to invalidate a self-presentation, 
the more likely it is for an actor to self-aggrandize (Schlenker 1980). On the other hand, when 
someone in the audience is known to possess relevant information about the actor, it should be 
easy for others to check the veracity of a self-presentation and, consequently, unlikely that the 
actor will succeed at deception.  
Whereas knowledge of the actor is a characteristic of the audience, discreditability is a 
characteristic of an actor who is at risk of being “exposed” by a knowledgeable other. Goffman 
(1963) describes actors as discreditable when potentially stigmatizing information about them is 
generally unknown to others, but at risk of being discovered. This risk increases with the 
presence of someone who has access to relevant information that is not widely known. In the 
present context, consumers who deceive in the presence of someone who knows the truth are at 
risk of being discredited. In summary, the greater is the likelihood of consumers’ being 
discredited by others with relevant information about them, the higher is their cost of deceiving, 
the lower is their probability of pulling off deceptive performances and, therefore, the lower 
should be their intentions to deceive. In contrast, evasion involves wholly or partly avoiding the 
disclosure of relevant information, leaving the other with nothing to discredit. As a result, 
discreditability should have no impact on consumers’ intentions to evade. 
Persistence. Persistence is defined as the quality or state of continuing firmly or 
obstinately with a course of action in spite of difficulty or opposition (Oxford 2012). In this 
research, we consider persistence as a characteristic of an audience member who witnesses a 
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self-presentation. Research on criminal investigations links the persistence of interrogators to 
reductions in the amount of evasive or incomplete responses provided by suspects (Inbau, et al. 
2011). Evasion is a risky strategy for an individual who faces another who is expected to 
continue probing for a more definitive answer (Buller, Strzyzewski, and Comstock 1991) 
because evasiveness can easily be detected in those occasions (Burgoon et al. 1994), especially 
when listeners focus more on the message than on the speaker (Rogers and Norton 2011). By 
contrast, continued probing does not necessarily improve an audience’s ability to detect 
deception (Buller et al. 1989). Of course, persistence in understanding and meeting customers’ 
needs has been described as an attribute of effective salespeople (Sujan, Weitz, and Kumar 
1994), making persistence germane not only to criminal interrogations, but also to personal 
selling. In summary, the persistence of a key audience member should decrease the probability of 
pulling off an evasive performance and, therefore reduce actors’ intentions to evade, but not 
deceive.  
Overall, we expect the potential to be discredited by a knowledgeable other to affect 
consumers’ intentions to deceive, but not evade; and the presence of a persistent other to affect 
consumers’ intentions to evade, but not deceive. Together, we expect the two moderating 
variables to support the proposed distinction between evasive and deceptive responses by 
showing that each tactic has at least one distinct antecedent. 
 
1.2 Research Overview 
To summarize, this chapter extends research on self-presentation and non-truthful 
responding by: (1) examining evasion as an important and distinct alternative to deception for 
those who wish to avoid truthful disclosures of consumption information, (2) exploring 
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differences in the psychological consequences of evading versus deceiving, (3) assessing 
anticipated embarrassment as a mediator of the effects of unfavorable performance information 
on efforts to avoid the truth, and (4) investigating moderators that differentially affect the two 
alternative means of managing the flow of unfavorable information. 
The remainder of this manuscript presents four lab experiments that explore when and 
why evasion (rather than deception) may be used to manage disclosures of consumption 
information. The purpose of these experiments is to seek a better understanding of why 
consumers avoid revealing outcomes of unfavorable social comparisons, the conditions under 
which they favor one alternative over the other, and some psychological consequences of 
choosing one approach over the other. 
We report the results of five laboratory experiments to accomplish these objectives. 
Study 1A provides an initial exploration of evasion as a viable and preferred alternative to 
deception by allowing participants to indicate the responses that they would most likely provide 
when asked a question that could reveal that they overpaid for a product. Study 1B replicates the 
self-reported response distribution found in Study 1A examining real behavioral responses to a 
query about the outcome of a bogus consumer credit assessment. This study also provides initial 
empirical evidence for our distinction between evasion and deception by testing predicted 
differences in the psychological consequences of these tactics. Study 2 examines the effect of 
comparing unfavorably to others on intentions to evade versus deceive in response to a request 
for price information, and provides an initial assessment of previously theorized, yet untested, 
driver of non-truthful communications. Studies 3 and 4 seek additional support for the distinction 
between evasion and deception by exploring moderators that should differentially affect the two 
approaches to avoiding the disclosure of truthful information. Study 3 examines whether the 
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potential to be discredited by another moderates intentions to deceive, but not evade. It also 
provides a more fulsome examination of psychological mediators by considering several 
alternatives to embarrassment. Study 4 examines whether the persistence of the questioner 
moderates intentions to evade, but not deceive in response to a request for credit information. 
 
1.3 STUDY 1A 
Study 1A provides an initial examination of evasion as an alternative to deception for 
consumers who are reluctant to reveal self-threatening consumption information. 
 
1.3.1 Method 
Two hundred and seventy-eight (111 female) participants of an online panel completed 
the study for a small monetary payment. Participants saw one of two hypothetical scenarios 
presenting a dialog between two guests at a resort hotel. Participants read that they paid either 
more than or as much as a same sex guest who purchased a similar product (a 4-night stay in a 
hotel with a similar room and view), reflecting price disparity and conditions, respectively. 
Gender was collected beforehand to enable presentation of the scenarios as same-sex interactions 
to avoid confounding deception motives associated with social interactions between sexes 
(DePaulo et al., 1996). Full text of the scenario is provided in the appendix. 
In the last line of the scenario dialogue, participants are told how much the other guest 
paid, and are asked to reveal the price they paid for their room. The dialog format was used to 
manipulate information about relative prices and to prompt naturalistic responses from 
participants. In the disparity condition, participants ($1,000) paid more than the other guest 
($800). In the control condition, both parties paid the same price ($1,000). This setup was based 
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on prior research on deception in consumer social comparisons (e.g. Argo et al. 2006). After 
reading the scenario and dialog, participants were asked to choose one of three options 
constructed to represent truthful (“I would say the price that I actually paid”), deceptive (“I 
would say I paid less than I actually paid”), or evasive (“I would give them a response that does 
not directly answer the question, or does not answer it at all”) responses. Option order was 
randomized.  
We used three items (measured on a seven-point scale) to assess the price disparity 
manipulation (“I paid much less [more] than the other guest,” “I [The other guest] got a better 
deal than the other guest [me],” “I paid a much lower [higher] price relative to the other guest;” 
α = .92) and three items to assess participant comprehension that both parties in the scenario 
purchased similar products (“Not at all [Extremely] similar,” “Not at all [Very much] identical,” 
“Not at all [Very much] the same”; α = .93). Finally, participants completed a suspicion-probe 
question before being thanked and dismissed. Responses to the suspicion probe suggest that none 
of the participants identified the study’s purpose. 
 
1.3.2 Results 
The manipulation check revealed a successful price disparity manipulation (Mdisparity = 
5.84 vs. Mno disparity = 3.97; F(1, 275) = 463.62, p < .0001) and the comprehension check suggest 
that participants understood that they and the other guest had similar rooms (M = 6.37, SD = .94 
on a seven-point scale). Consistent with prior research (Argo et al. 2006, 2011; Sengupta et al. 
2002), we found that consumers were less likely to give truthful responses when they paid more 
than another consumer (70.0%) than when they paid the same amount (87.0%; χ2(1) = 11.81, p < 
.01). We also replicate previous findings that participants were more likely to deceive given a 
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negative price disparity relative to control (7.9% vs. 0.0%; Fisher’s exact p < .001). More 
importantly, participants were more likely to evade given a negative price disparity than in the 
control condition (22.1% vs. 13.0%; χ2(1) = 3.96, p < .05), with evasion a significantly more 
common response than deception among those who overpaid (22.1% vs. 7.9%;  χ2(1) = 11.20, p 
< .001). We also observed a non-zero rate of evasion in the control condition (18.0% vs. 0.0%; 
Fisher’s exact test p < .001), suggesting that some consumers may generally be reluctant to share 
price information with others. Table 1.1 presents response option counts and proportions for all 
conditions. 
TABLE 1.1: MOST LIKELY RESPONSE TO 
A PRICE INQUIRY (STUDY 1A) 
              
    Condition 
  Disparity  No Disparity 
       
Truthful 
 
98 (70.0%) 
 
120 (87.0%) 
Deceptive 
 
11 (7.9%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
Evasive 
 
31 (22.1%) 
 
18 (13.0%) 
       Total 
 
140 (100%) 
 
138 (100%) 
              
 
1.3.3 Discussion 
Study 1A contributes initial evidence of evasion as an attractive, and possibly preferred, 
alternative to deception for consumers who want to manage information that reflects unfavorably 
upon them. While these results are promising, and most prior research examining consumer 
deception behavior uses self-reported scale measures (for exception see Argo and Shiv 2012), 
participants may have chosen evasion over deception to present themselves in a more socially 
desirable manner. Our next study seeks to replicate these results examining real word of mouth 
behavior to assess this possibility. 
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1.4 STUDY 1B 
Study 1B has three goals. First, as mentioned above, we attempt to assess the potential 
shortcomings of self-reported behavioral intentions for socially undesirable behaviors as used in 
Study 1A and prior research examining consumer deception. 
Second, we seek to replicate our initial test of evasion in the context of consumer-to-
consumer information exchanges of credit scores rather than price information to help 
demonstrate robustness and generalizability. 
Third, we test our predictions that the psychological consequences of self-interested 
deception, guilt and shame, may be linked to consumer tendencies to use evasive rather than 
deceptive responding in self-threatening social interactions.  
 
1.4.1 Method 
Undergraduate students (N = 212, 107 female) at a Canadian university participated in 
the study for partial course credit. Participants were run one at a time in a small lab room with 
another individual of the same sex who posed as another student participant (confederate). Same 
sex interaction partners were used as in the pilot study. The participant and the confederate were 
first invited to complete a national survey of credit-worthiness using a widely accepted credit-
score test (FICO). Participants were told that they would learn their personal credit score as a 
bonus for taking the survey. Participants privately see an electronic copy of their own credit 
report indicating a FICO score of 610, indicating “low credit-worthiness” (disparity condition) or 
775, indicating “excellent credit-worthiness” (no disparity condition). After completing the 
survey and receiving this (bogus) information about their credit scores, they were informed by a 
research assistant that a third participant who was scheduled for an unrelated group discussion 
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study had not arrived. The research assistant left the participant and confederate in the room 
unattended, ostensibly to find the third participant. While the participant and confederate were by 
themselves, the confederate revealed his/her credit score, which was either higher than (disparity 
condition) or the same as the participant's score (no disparity condition). The confederate then 
asked the participant about his/her credit score. The confederate was instructed to allow the 
participant to respond to the question before coughing as a signal for the research assistant to re-
enter the room. 
Upon returning, the research assistant advised the participant and confederate that they 
would skip the group discussion due to the “missing” third participant, and proceed to a final 
computer-based study. This part of the study served several purposes. First, it asked participants 
to indicate whether the confederate asked them anything after the research assistant left the room; 
and, if so, what (open-ended). This question was used to confirm that participants heard the 
question and recalled it accurately. Participants were next asked to report how they answered the 
question and to indicate the extent to which a series of words described how they felt after 
responding to the other student’s question. We asked how shameful (ashamed, humiliated, 
disgraced) and guilty (repentant, guilty, blameworthy) they felt about their response using items 
from Tangney et al. (2006) to test for our prediction that these negative self-conscious emotions 
were a stronger consequence for deceptive than evasive responses. We also captured three items 
measuring embarrassment (awkward, uncomfortable, embarrassed). As discussed in conceptual 
development, while we expect this negative self-conscious emotion underlies intentions to 
deceive or evade (mediation; tested in studies 2 and 3), we expect a null effect for this emotion 
as a consequence of deceptive and evasive responding. All items used seven-point scales (from 1 
= Not at all to 7 = Very much).  
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We used three items (measured on a seven-point scale) to assess the credit score disparity 
manipulation (“I was less [more] credit-worthy than the other student,” “I [The other student] got 
a lower credit score than the other student [me],” “I had a worse [better] credit score than the 
other student;” α = .96). A funneled debriefing was performed, including checks for suspicion 
and hypothesis guessing. The confederates and one of two research assistants were blind to 
condition and hypotheses. The second research assistant was blind to condition but not to 
hypotheses. There was no difference in the pattern of results by research assistant. 
Participants’ open-ended verbal responses to the confederate’s prompt as recorded by an 
audio device served as the dependent measure. Two independent research assistants who did not 
participate as confederates transcribed the audio recordings to text. Three more independent 
judges assessed the transcription of participants’ verbal responses. Judges were asked to code 
factually accurate responses as “truthful,” factually inaccurate responses as “deceptive,” and 
vague or indirect responses that were neither factually accurate nor inaccurate as “evasive.” 
Inter-judge agreement was 84%. Disagreements were resolved by majority rule. 
 
1.4.2 Results 
The confederate, research assistant and audio transcriptionist were provided a mechanism 
to indicate suspicious participants as they were processing participants.  Participants for which 
there was majority agreement regarding suspicion were withheld from analysis. Twenty 
participants were withheld from analysis using this procedure. The high frequency of suspicion 
was due to participants showing up earlier than their scheduled time, in which case they saw the 
confederate in the lab room before the study began. Using unanimous rather than majority 
agreement on suspicion as the exclusion criteria produces the same statistical conclusions as 
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those reported below. No participants guessed that the study was concerned with evasive or 
deceptive responding. The audio recording of the response to the confederate’s question about 
the participant’s credit score was inaudible for one participant, leaving a total of 191 participants 
for analysis. 
Manipulation Checks. All but two participants recalled that the confederate asked about 
their credit score. Consistent with condition assignment, analysis of variance on the mean of the 
three credit disparity check items revealed that participants in the disparity condition perceived 
themselves to be on the short end of the credit score comparison (M = 6.42), compared to those 
in the no disparity condition (M = 3.45; F(1, 189) = 481.17, p < .001). 
Main Results. An omnibus Fisher’s exact test revealed that the pattern of responses was 
significantly different across the disparity and no disparity conditions (p < .0001). Replicating 
the pilot study, participants were less likely to be truthful when there was a consumer 
performance disparity (60.6%) than in the no disparity condition (88.7%; χ2(1) = 18.46, p < 
.0001). Participants in the disparity condition were more evasive (25.5% vs. 11.3%; χ2(1) = 6.42, 
p = .01) and more deceptive (13.8% vs. 0%; Fisher’s exact test p < .0001) than were participants 
in the no disparity condition. Given a credit-score disparity, participants were significantly more 
likely to use evasion than deception (25.5% vs. 13.8%; χ2(1) = 4.07, p <.05; cf. table 1.2).  
TABLE 1.2: REAL BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES 
TO A CREDIT SCORE INQUIRY (STUDY 1B) 
    Condition 
  Disparity  No Disparity 
       
Truthful 
 
57 (60.6%) 
 
86 (88.7%) 
Deceptive 
 
13 (13.8%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
Evasive 
 
24 (25.5%) 
 
11 (11.3%) 
       Total 
 
94 (100.0%) 
 
97 (100.0%) 
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Emotional Consequences. As predicted, when attempting to avoid unfavorable 
information disclosures, deception produced more guilt and shame than evasion. First, we 
replicated previous findings that participants who used deception felt more guilt and shame than 
those who told the truth (Guilt: α = .87; Deception = 3.56 vs. Truth = 1.83; t(68) = 3.58, p = 
.003; Shame: α = .91; Deception = 3.82 vs. Truth = 2.08; t(68) = 3.18, p = .006). Deceptive 
participants also felt more embarrassment than those who told the truth (α = .91; Deception = 
4.26 vs. Truth = 2.78; t(68) = 3.15, p < .01). The same tests contrasting evasive with truthful 
participants reveals that evasive participants felt no more guilty than truthful participants 
(Evasion = 2.33 vs. Truth = 1.83; t(79) = 1.44, p > .15), and only marginally more shameful 
(Evasion = 2.64 vs. Truth = 2.08; t(79) = 1.75, p = .09). However, like those who were deceptive, 
evasive participants felt significantly more embarrassment than those who told the unfavorable 
truth about their credit score (Evasion = 3.53 vs. Truth = 2.78; t(79) = 2.01, p < .05). 
Most centrally to the present research, participants who used deception reported feeling 
significantly more guilt and shame than did participants who used evasion (Guilt: Deception = 
3.56 vs. Evasion = 2.33; t(35) = 2.16, p < .05; Shame: Deception = 3.82 vs. Evasion = 2.64;  
t(35) = 2.15, p < .05). As predicted, there was no difference in embarrassment as a consequence 
of either deceptive or evasive responding (Deception = 4.26 vs. Evasion = 3.53; t(35) = 1.13, p > 
.25). 
 
1.4.3 Discussion 
Study 1B uses real interactions in a controlled laboratory setting to find evidence of 
evasion as a possible alternative to deception when people are asked to share unfavorable 
consumer information. We replicate the results in Study 1A and prior research that has used 
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scale-based intention measures of deception in a real behavioral setting, suggesting that desirable 
responding is not a major concern.  
Consistent with this prior research that commonly reports scale-based intentions below 
the scale midpoint, we find deception a minority behavior. Most centrally to the present research, 
we find evasion to be a significantly more common behavioral response than deception. Notably, 
we again observe that the distribution of actual responses is similar to that of the self-reported 
intentions captured in the pilot study. This result suggests that participants were somewhat 
accurate in estimating their behavioral intentions and truthful in terms of reporting them, even 
when these intentions involve socially undesirable behavior, and that the lower reported level for 
deception might require an alternative explanation than socially desirable responding. 
This study also contributes evidence that evasion has distinct emotional consequences 
from deception. For those attempting to avoid the disclosure of unfavorable information, evasion 
produced less guilt and shame than deception. This suggests lower emotional costs for avoiding 
the truth (evasion) than producing a falsehood (deception). Relative to evasion, deception brings 
greater degree of guilt and shame, which are known to be more severe than embarrassment 
(Tangney et al. 1996; Buss 1980; Lewis 1992). Based on the empirical linkage between moral 
transgressions and deception (Bok 2011; Mazar et al. 2008), this result suggests that evasion may 
not pose the same self-concept threat as deception. 
In our next study we build on these findings in two ways. First, we seek to assess whether 
the rate of self-reported intentions to either evade or deceive in the face of social inquiries about 
unfavorable consumer information are similar to those revealed in study 1. Second, we examine 
the three negative self-conscious emotions (guilt, shame, and embarrassment) as triggers—rather 
than consequences—of avoiding the disclosure of unfavorable information. While guilt and 
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shame are stronger consequences for deception than evasion, we expect embarrassment will be 
the primary trigger (mediator) for non-truthful responses to social requests for unfavorable word 
of mouth information. 
 
1.5 STUDY 2 
In study 2, we examine the extent to which unfavorable performance disparities increase 
consumers’ intentions to either evade or deceive in response to questions about their 
consumption outcomes. This study also seeks to test embarrassment as a mediator of the effects 
of unfavorable performance disparities on intentions to provide evasive or deceptive responses. 
Argo et al.’s (2006) characterization of being on the short-end of a performance disparity as a 
threat to one’s public self-image is consistent with the idea that comparing unfavorably to others 
can be a source of anticipated embarrassment, which arises from threats to the presented self in 
the presence of real or imagined audiences (Schlenker 1980; Lau-Gesk and Drolet 2008). 
Although they did not conduct formal tests of mediation, Argo et al.’s discussion of unfavorable 
social comparisons as threats to public self-images suggests embarrassment as a possible 
mediator of the effect of consumer performance disparities on individuals’ intentions to lie about 
their consumption outcomes.  
The fear of embarrassment motivates people to keep their behaviors within the limits of 
propriety and to withhold information that threatens their public self-images (Leary and 
Kowalski 1995). The notion that desires to avoid embarrassment can influence future behaviors 
suggests that embarrassment can be anticipatory as well as reactive. If people can feel 
embarrassed for others (Miller 1987, 1992; Stocks et al. 2011), then they should be able to feel 
embarrassed for future selves (Tangney et al. 1996; Verbeke and Bagozzi 2003), and respond 
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accordingly. We, therefore, propose and test embarrassment as a mediator of the effect of 
unfavorable performance disparities on consumers’ intentions to provide both evasive and 
deceptive responses to requests for information about performance outcomes. 
 
1.5.1 Method 
Two hundred twenty-seven (138 female) members of an online panel successfully 
completed the study in return for a small cash payment. Participants were randomly assigned to 
read one of three versions of a hypothetical situation involving same sex interaction partners (see 
appendix for stimuli). Participants read scenarios that were similar to those used in the pilot 
study in which they paid either more than or as much as another for the same product. However, 
there were a few notable differences. In Study 1, the two parties were friends rather than 
strangers; the product was a television instead of a hotel room; and the price disparity 
manipulation included large disparity ($300), small disparity ($100) and control (no disparity) 
conditions. We varied the size of the disparity based on previous findings that larger disparities 
are associated with higher levels of depression (Strohnmer, Biggs and McIntyre 1984) and 
greater intentions to deceive (Argo et al. 2006).  
Following the scenario, we collected six scaled measures of participant’s intentions to 
evade or deceive in response to the friend’s price inquiry. Participants indicated their likelihood 
of: (1) revealing the actual price (reverse scored), (2) concealing the actual price, and (3) being 
evasive about the price, (4) misrepresenting the actual price, (5) being deceptive about the price, 
and (6) misleading their friend about the price. The first three items were intended to capture 
evasion intentions, and the latter three deception intentions. All items were measured with seven 
point scales anchored by 1 = Very unlikely and 7 = Very likely. Item order was randomized. 
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Reliabilities for the three item evasion and deception indices were α = .91 and α = .98, 
respectively. 
Anticipated embarrassment was measured with three items assessing the extent to which 
participants would feel embarrassed, awkward, and uncomfortable (on seven point scales from 
“Not at all” to “Very”) in the situation described in the scenario. These three items were 
averaged to form an embarrassment index (α = .87). Finally, as in the pilot study, participants 
completed checks to assess the price disparity manipulation (α = .94) and comprehension that the 
scenario involved purchases of similar products (α = .95). 
 
1.5.2 Results 
Manipulation Checks. Consistent with condition assignments, participants in the disparity 
conditions perceived a significantly larger price gap than control participants (Mdisparity= 5.97, 
Mno disparity = 3.88; F(1, 225) = 333.45, p < .001). Moreover, participants in the large disparity 
condition perceived a significantly larger price gap than those in the small disparity condition 
(Mlarge= 6.29 vs. Msmall= 5.63; F(1, 150) = 22.76,  p< .001). Finally, participants understood that 
the television they purchased was extremely similar to the one purchased by their friend (M = 
6.88, SD =.40 on a seven point scale). 
Main Results. Analysis of variance revealed no differences in deception (F < 1) or 
evasion intentions (F(1, 150) = 1.17, p = .28) due to price disparity level. In hindsight, this 
finding is consistent with Argo et al.’s (2006, study 1) finding that disparity size affects 
deception intentions only when the comparison target is socially distant (i.e., a stranger rather 
than a friend). As a result, we collapsed our data across disparity levels, resulting in two 
experimental conditions (disparity and control). 
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Participants in the disparity condition reported greater intentions to deceive (F(1, 225) = 
37.91, p < .001) and evade (F(1, 225) = 30.46, p < .001) than did control participants. Moreover, 
participants reported higher intentions to evade than to deceive in both the disparity (t(152) = 
4.49, p < .001) and control conditions (t(75) = 3.29, p < .01). In short, both responses were more 
likely among disparity than control participants, with evasion seeing stronger intentions than 
deception in both conditions. Condition means are summarized in figure 1.1. 
FIGURE 1.1 
INTENTIONS TO DECEIVE AND EVADE 
BY PRICE DISPARITY CONDITION (STUDY 2) 
 
 
Mediation. Bootstrapping tests of embarrassment as a mediator of the relationship 
between social comparison outcomes and either evasion or deception intentions (Preacher, 
Rucker and Hayes 2007) showed that embarrassment mediated the effects of unfavorable 
comparisons on both response options. The indirect effect was significant for both evasion (95% 
CI = [.28, .55] with 5,000 resamples) and deception (95% CI = [.24, .52]). All path coefficients 
for both models are positive and significant at p < .05 (table 1.3). 
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TABLE 1.3: MEDIATION BY EMBARRASSMENT (STUDY 2) 
 
 
 
 
1.5.3 Discussion 
In study 2, we used scaled intention measures to show that evasion is an attractive 
alternative to deception among consumers who are reluctant to respond truthfully to requests for 
unfavorable consumption information. The results of study 2 using scaled responses replicate our 
study findings using a forced-choice paradigm and real behavioral measures. We again found 
that participants reported stronger evasion than deception intentions when they sought to avoid 
revealing price information. Embarrassment mediated the effects of an unfavorable performance 
disparity on both means of avoiding the truth.  
Thus far, our findings suggest that evasion may be an emotionally preferable alternative 
to deception as a means of avoiding the truth. In studies 3 and 4, we seek further evidence that 
the two response tactics are distinct by examining contextual variables that may moderate 
intentions to use one without affecting the other. In study 3, we consider how the presence of an 
informed other, which gives rise to the potential to be discredited, can impact deception but not 
evasion intentions. In study 4, we consider how questions from a persistent other impact evasion, 
but not deception intentions.  
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1.6 STUDY 3 
In this study, we test our prediction that discreditability, the presence of an informed 
other can affect the strategy that people use to hide the truth about unfavorable consumption 
outcomes. The presence of a third party who knows the truth about an unfavorable consumption 
outcome is expected to decrease one’s intentions to deceive, but not evade in response to a 
request for information about the outcome in question. According to Goffman (1963), concerns 
about being discredited arise when potentially stigmatizing information is generally unknown to 
others, but at risk of being discovered. This risk increases with the presence of someone who has 
access to relevant information that is unknown to others. In the present context, consumers who 
deceive in the presence of one who knows the truth are at risk of being discredited as a liar, a 
stigmatizing condition that causes feelings of guilt and shame (Keltner and Buswell 1996). The 
easier it is for an audience to invalidate a self-presentation, the less likely people are to 
misrepresent themselves (Schlenker 1980). The use of evasion, on the other hand, should provide 
little or no relevant information to invalidate, making it largely unaffected by the threat of 
discreditability. Therefore, we expect the threat of being discredited to reduce intentions to 
deceive but not evade in response to a request for information about an unfavorable consumption 
outcome. In this study, we also conduct a more fulsome examination of our proposed mediator 
(embarrassment) to rule out alternative mediating variables such as shame, guilt, envy, 
resentment and generalized depressive affect. 
 
1.6.1 Method 
One hundred and ninety-eight (89 female) undergraduate students at a Canadian 
university completed the study for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
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four conditions in a 2 (Disparity: Yes vs. No) x 2 (Discreditability: High vs. Low) between-
subjects design. As in the pilot study, we used a single disparity condition ($200) versus a no 
disparity (control) condition. Similar to the pilot study, each participant read a scenario about an 
unfavorable price disparity involving a television purchase. Discreditability was manipulated by 
varying the number of people present who knew the true price paid for the television (see 
appendix for stimuli). In the low discreditability condition, the participant was the only one who 
knew how much he/she paid for the television. In the high discreditability condition, a second 
person also knew the actual price paid for the television. Scenarios were constructed to involve 
same-sex interactions. 
We next collected the same measures used in study 2 to capture participants’ intentions to 
evade or deceive in response to the friend’s price inquiry (order randomized). The three items for 
measuring embarrassment from study 2 were included used to assess the robustness of this 
mediating variable. We also collected previously validated items capturing other self-conscious 
emotions (shame and guilt) and other emotions that are potentially associated with upward social 
comparison context (anger, envy, and resentment) to rule out alternative mediators. For the sake 
of thoroughness, we included additional measures of embarrassment from Tangney et al. (1996). 
All emotion items are listed in the appendix. 
Participants then completed a series of manipulation checks. First, they were asked to 
indicate how many of the friends in the scenario knew the actual price paid for the television. 
The following three items were used to assess the discreditability manipulation: (1) how hard it 
would be for the friends to find out the actual price (reverse scored), (2) how easily the friends 
could discover the real price paid, and (3) how accessible the true price was to the friends (1 = 
Not at all, 7 = Very much). Finally, checks regarding the size and direction of the price disparity 
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and the similarity of the televisions purchased were measured in the same manner as in prior 
studies. 
 
1.6.2 Results 
Manipulation Checks. All participants correctly identified how many of their friends 
knew the actual price paid for the television. Consistent with condition assignments, analysis of 
variance on the mean of the three discreditability check items (α  = .92) revealed that participants 
in the high discreditability condition perceived a higher risk of discreditability (M = 5.69) than 
those in the low discreditability condition (M= 4.10; F(1,196) = 44.14, p < .001). Participants in 
the disparity condition perceived a greater price disparity (M = 6.10) than did participants in the 
no disparity condition (M = 4.03, F(1, 196) = 547.19, p < .001), and all participants recognized 
that both parties purchased similar televisions (M = 6.74, SD = 0.70 on a seven-point scale). The 
evasion (α  = .84) and deception (α  = .95) intention items again fit a two-factor model better 
than a single factor model (CFA ∆χ2(1) = 93.94, p < .0001). 
Main Results. ANOVA on the composite measure of deception intentions revealed a 
significant main effect of a disparity (Mdisparity= 2.59 vs. Mno disparity = 1.68; F(1,194) = 17.15, p < 
.001), no effect of discreditability (F < 1), and a significant disparity by discreditability 
interaction (F(1,194) = 9.48, p < .01). While there was no difference in deception intentions 
between high and low discreditability participants in the no disparity condition (F(1, 100) = 2.42, 
p > .10), high discreditability participants were significantly less likely to deceive than were their 
low discreditability counterparts when faced with a price disparity (F(1, 94) = 7.24, p < .01). See 
figure 1.2 for means. 
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ANOVA for evasion intentions yielded a main effect of disparity (Mdisparity = 3.47 vs. Mno 
disparity = 2.31; F(1,194) = 24.40, p < .001),no effect of discreditability (F < 1), and a significant 
disparity by discreditability interaction (F(1,194) = 4.32, p < .05). Despite the unexpected cross-
over interaction, evasion intentions did not differ with discreditability within either the disparity 
(F(1, 94) = 2.58, p > .10) or no disparity condition (F(1, 100) = 2.60, p > .10), unlike deception 
intentions which were significantly reduced when participants in the disparity condition were 
more discreditable. 
FIGURE 1.2: SOURCE DISCREDITABILITY IMPACTS DECEPTION 
(NOT EVASION) INTENTIONS (STUDY 3) 
 
Mediation. We used a simple mediation model to examine all emotion items as 
simultaneous parallel mediators of the relationship between a consumer performance disparity 
and either evasion or deception intentions (Preacher et al. 2007). The results show that paying 
more than another consumer significantly affects each measured emotion (a path), but only 
embarrassment mediates the effects of this unfavorable outcome on both response options (b 
paths; cf. table 1.4). This effect occurred regardless of whether embarrassment was captured by 
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the measures used in study 1 or measures used in prior research (Tangney et al. 1996). For 
brevity, we report the mediation analyses conducted on the latter. The conditional indirect effect 
of a price disparity through embarrassment was significant for both evasion (95% CI = [.23, .94] 
with 5,000 resamples) and deception (95% CI = [.22, .91]). All path coefficients for both 
embarrassment mediation models are positive and significant at p < .05 (cf. table 1.4). 
Depression measures negatively mediated the relationship between price disparity and 
deception intentions (but not evasion intentions) in the full model. However, when the model 
was reduced to include only the significant embarrassment and depression mediators, 
embarrassment remains significant (95% CI = [.30, .73]) while depression falls to non-
significance (95% CI = [-.49, .11]), supporting embarrassment as the dominant mediator of the 
relationship between an unfavorable disparity and evasive or deceptive responding. 
 
TABLE 1.4 
MEDIATION BY EMBARRASSMENT (STUDY 3) 
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1.6.3 Discussion 
Study 3 demonstrates that discreditability decreases consumers’ intentions to deceive 
without affecting their evasion intentions, thereby supporting our distinction between evasion 
and deception by providing evidence of a unique moderator of deception. Moreover, study 3 
replicates our findings of embarrassment as the mechanism underlying the relationship between 
unfavorable performance disparities and non-truthful response intentions. Specifically, the study 
rules out shame, guilt, envy, resentment, and depressive feelings as mediators of the effect. 
While study 3 shows that the risk of being discredited decreases deception (but not evasion) 
intentions, study 4 examines a variable that should moderate intentions to evade, but not deceive. 
 
1.7 STUDY 4 
Our last study examines a variable that should moderate intentions to evade, but not 
deceive. As discussed in conceptual development, persistence is defined as the quality or state of 
continuing firmly or obstinately with a course of action in spite of difficulty or opposition 
(Oxford 2012). The presence of a questioner who is expected to persevere until getting an answer 
should complicate efforts to evade, but not deceive, because evasiveness can be easy to detect 
(Burgoon et al. 1994). In contrast, continued probing does not necessarily improve the ability to 
detect deception (Buller et al. 1989). 
 
1.7.1 Method 
Study 4 employed a 2 (Disparity: Yes vs. No) x 2 (Persistence: High vs. Low) between-
subjects design. One hundred and eighty six (71 female) undergraduate students at a Canadian 
university participated for partial course credit. Participants were presented with a situation in 
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which they were meeting a group of same-sex friends at a mall food court. On the way to the 
food court, the participant and a friend (the interaction partner) stop at a kiosk where each 
receives a free credit report. Participants privately see an electronic copy of their own credit 
report indicating a FICO score of 610, indicating “low credit-worthiness” (disparity condition) or 
775, indicating “excellent credit-worthiness” (no disparity condition). Later, while socializing 
with friends over lunch, the participant overhears the interaction partner being either very 
persistent or not very persistent when asking another friend about a recent exam. In the scenario, 
the participant thinks about how this display of high (or low) persistence is typical of the 
interaction partner. The interaction partner then announces to everyone present that both she/he 
and the participant just obtained their credit scores. The interaction partner mentions that she/he 
had a rating of “excellent credit-worthiness” with a FICO score of 775, and then asks the 
participant, “What about you?” (see appendix for full stimuli). 
Immediately after participants read this scenario, we measured evasion (α = .85) and 
deception (α  = .95) intentions. Confirmatory factor analysis again supports evasion and 
deception as independent factors (χ2(1) = 162.57 , p < .0001).We next used three seven-point 
bipolar items to assess the persistence manipulation (“relenting:unrelenting,” 
“surrendering:persistent,” “unyielding:yielding”; α  = .60). Each participant also completed 
manipulation checks to assess understanding of who knew their credit score and how their score 
compared to that of their friend. 
 
1.7.2 Results 
Manipulation Checks. Participants in the high persistence condition perceived the 
inquiring friend as more persistent (M = 4.91) than did participants in the low persistence 
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condition (M = 3.49; F(1, 172) = 83.90, p < .001). Responses to an adapted version of the same 
three-item price disparity check (α = .94) used in prior studies (i.e. the words “deal” or “price” 
were replaced with the words “credit score”) confirms that participants in the disparity condition 
perceived themselves as having paid more than their friend (Mdisparity = 6.16 vs. Mno disparity = 4.03; 
F(1, 172) = 182.91, p < .001). One hundred and thirty-seven (94%) participants correctly 
indicated that only they knew their own credit score. Excluding participants who failed this 
check did not change the main results. 
Main Results. Omnibus analysis of variance of disparity and persistence on the two 
tactics to avoid disclosing self-threatening information revealed a main effect of the credit-score 
disparity for both evasion intentions (F(1, 169) = 7.82, p < .01) and deception intentions (F(1, 
170) = 6.43, p < .05). Participants had greater evasion and deception intentions when they fared 
worse than others than when they performed on par with their peers.  
Most importantly, there was a significant interaction of disparity and persistence for 
evasion intentions (F(1, 169) = 7.83, p < .01). Participants in the disparity condition had lower 
evasion intentions when faced with a more (M = 3.86) versus less (M = 4.59) persistent inquirer 
(F(1, 85) = 4.61, p < .05; see figure 1.3).Deception intentions, on the other hand, were unaffected 
by the interaction partner’s persistence, even when participants fared worse than their peers 
(Mhigh = 3.49 vs. Mlow= 3.41; F < 1).  
Comparing the effect of a credit score disparity within persistence level, we see no 
change in evasion intentions given a more persistent interaction partner (F < 1), but significantly 
higher evasion intentions given a credit score disparity and a less persistent interaction partner 
(4.59 vs. 3.23; F(1, 84) = 17.88, p < .001). In contrast, these factors did not significantly affect 
deception intentions (Fs < 1). 
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FIGURE 1.3: AUDIENCE PERSISTENCE IMPACTS EVASION 
(NOT DECEPTION) INTENTIONS GIVEN PERFORMANCE DISPARITY (STUDY 4)  
 
 
 
1.7.3 Discussion 
Study 4 demonstrates that the persistence of an inquirer impacts intentions to evade, but 
not deceive, in response to a request for unfavorable credit information. This provides additional 
support for our distinction between evasion and deception by contributing evidence that evasion 
has at least one unique moderator. Taken together, studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that despite 
representing alternative approaches to avoiding embarrassing truths, evasion and deception are 
likely to be used under different circumstances. Although tendencies to evade or deceive can be 
motivated by a similar emotional antecedent, each tactic is favored under different 
circumstances. 
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1.8 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Although a large body of research documents the use of outright deception to protect the 
liar or another from psychological discomfort, there has been scant empirical consideration of 
how people might employ a less costly means to a similar end.  
The present research begins to address this gap by contributing evidence of evasion as an 
alternative to deception as a means of managing disclosures of unfavorable consumption 
information. The field has focused on lying, to the exclusion of this other category of responses 
that may be in fact more pervasive in the consumer-to-consumer communications. In contrast to 
recent efforts to investigate how people who dodge questions are perceived by their audiences 
(Rogers and Norton 2011; Bickart et al. 2015), the present research considers the perspective of 
the people who choose to be evasive within the context of consumer-to-consumer 
communication. 
We found the two tactics to have similar antecedents (i.e., performance disparities and 
embarrassment), but more importantly, different psychological consequences and moderators. 
Specifically, people who engaged in evasion reported feeling less guilt and shame than did their 
counterparts who deceived. This result may explain why we consistently found consumers to 
prefer evasion over deception as a means of managing information about unfavorable social 
comparison outcomes. Moreover, deception (but not evasion) intentions declined with the risk of 
being discredited by an interaction partner, while evasion (but not deception) intentions 
decreased as a function of the persistence of an inquirer. 
Recently, consumer researchers have documented evasion as an effective tactic to avoid 
conveying information that might pose threat to the self in various marketing settings, in which 
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the communicator is either a focus group participant who is motivated to make desired 
impression (Wooten and Reed 2000) or a salesperson who seeks greater potential sales (Bickart 
et al. 2015).  Building on such endeavors, the current research serves as the first to study evasion 
as an alternative to deception when consumers share unfavorable consumption information with 
other consumers. Inasmuch as the most impactful word-of-mouth takes a form of consumers’ 
face-to-face communication, this study sheds light on our understanding of potential threat to the 
quality of word-of-mouth communications. A global survey conducted by Nielsen (2013) reports 
that consumers rely on word-of-mouth communication more now than they did before, and more 
heavily than they do on commercial messages. Specifically, the percentages of consumers who 
reportedly trust information from people they know or from consumer opinions posted on line 
were higher in 2013 than they were in 2007. Moreover, higher percentages of consumers were 
reportedly willing to trust or act on information from these sources than on information from 
television commercials or branded websites. These findings support estimates from a major 
consulting that word-of-mouth influences 20 to 50 percent of all purchasing decisions and 
generates more than twice the sales of paid advertising in a variety of product categories 
(McKinsey 2010), and are in accordance with the empirical evidence that the word-of-mouth 
communications affect sales (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Godes and Mayzlin 2009) and 
influence product choices (Leskovec, Adamic, and Huberman 2007). Given the impact of word-
of-mouth communication in the marketplace, we make a case that the pervasiveness of non-
truthful communication of consumption information within consumer-to-consumer context 
should sound the alarm to consumers who tend to overestimate the validity of information 
coming from other consumers and take the information into full account, in the tradition of other 
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research that questions the assumptions about the quality of word-of-mouth communications 
(Cheema and Kaikati 2010; Packard and Wooten 2013). 
Notably, however, our findings should mitigate concerns that deception is the dominant 
response to sensitive or self-threatening word of mouth exchanges (e.g. Anthony and Cowley 
2012; Argo, Dahl and White 2011; Argo and Shiv 2012; Argo et al. 2006; Mazar et al. 2008; 
Sengupta et al. 2002). Our results suggests that the suppression of true information is a greater 
risk than the introduction false information in word of mouth exchages. This finding holds 
positive implications for both consumers and firms. For example, consumers who lie to others 
about the price they paid for a product may create invalid price expectations for the recipients of 
this word of mouth information, leading to negative attitudes or service interactions when the 
recipient comes to find the true (higher) price. 
Our research also suggests practical implications for the firms who monitor or promote 
consumer-to-consumer communications for marketing research, either through ethnographic 
approaches, focus group approaches, or on the internet. Marketers may wish to provide an 
environment (e.g. online forums, customer communities) or create marketing communications 
that downplay the potential self-threat of negative consumption experiences. For example, focus 
group moderators could diffuse self-threat by creating an open, non-threatening conversational 
environment and thereby encourage truthful information exchanges among consumer research 
participants. Encouraging moderators in the focus group research to exhibit some degree of 
persistence might also help as participants would reduce sharing their information in evasive 
manner (study 3), although not all research in focus groups would deem the role of moderators 
important (Fern 1982). Similarly, salespeople may be trained to look for evasive responding, 
which should be easier to detect than deception (Buller et al. 1991). For example, if a car buyer 
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avoids responding to a salesperson’s inquiry about why they want a new car, the salesperson 
should take this as a cue that unflattering motives (e.g. prestige rather than functional need) may 
be driving their auto purchase. This insight could be taken to suggest the customer is less price 
sensitive, representing more useful information than the lie that could result if the salesperson 
persists in trying to understand why the customer wants a new car. 
This research also contributes new insight on the psychological mechanisms underlying 
decisions to avoid telling the truth about outcomes of unfavorable social comparisons, whether 
through evasion or deception. We found that embarrassment mediated the relationship between 
unfavorable social comparisons and both evasion and lying intentions when the social 
comparison information might be threatening to the self. While Argo et al. (2009) identified 
empathy as a mediator of consumers’ willingness to lie for friends who were victims of 
unfavorable social comparisons, it is possible that embarrassment mediates that effect as well. 
Observers may recognize and empathically share the discomfort felt by those who are 
embarrassed, even if the embarrassing actions do not reflect on the observers (Miller 1987, 1992; 
Stocks et al. 2011). Observers also may feel embarrassed if they can imagine themselves in the 
social predicament (Stocks et al. 2011), even when those who actually face the predicament 
display no visible signs of embarrassment (Miller 1987). Moreover, observers feel greater 
empathic embarrassment for those whom they like more (Stocks et al. 2011) or when they feel 
partly responsible for creating the embarrassment (Leary and Kowalski 1995). Future research is 
needed to assess embarrassment as a common mediator of the effects of both self- and other-
threatening social comparisons on intentions to either evade or deceive. 
While the present research provides a foundational exploration of the use of evasion as a 
response to social predicaments, much work remains to be done for a fulsome understanding of 
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when, why and how evasion occurs, both within and outside the domain of consumption. 
Wooten and Reed (2000) theorize that evasion may be especially likely to occur when 
individuals are highly motivated to make desired impressions, but uncertain of how to do so. By 
contrast, they argue that individuals may resort to deception when they are motivated to make 
certain impressions and they understand what is required for them to succeed. Their analysis 
suggests that evasion may be a useful tactic for individuals who wish to avoid looking bad 
whereas deception may be more useful for those who are more concerned about looking good. 
Our findings are consistent with their view of evasion as a protective, as opposed to an 
acquisitive response (Arkin 1981). However, deception appears to be useful for both protective 
and acquisitive styles of self-presentation. 
Future research should investigate behavioral and social consequences of evasive versus 
deceptive responding, in addition to the distinct psychological consequences explored here. 
Specifically, behavioral consequences to the recipients of the non-truthful responding should be 
explored in consumer-to-consumer communication, where evasive responding could only 
provide information that is not necessarily informative. Due to this motivated communication, 
information is being lost and hidden. Examining ways to best regain access to the lost 
information in the information maintenance perspective is an important direction for further 
investigation. For instance, its implications on the recipients’ subsequent information search 
behavior as opposed to when they are at the receiving end for false, misleading information call 
for a closer scrutiny. 
As even white lies intended to smooth social interactions can have negative personal and 
social consequences (Argo and Shiv 2012), evasion may offer a more socially acceptable means 
of avoiding inconvenient truths. For example, a consumer who is evasive in response to a retail 
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employee’s inquiry about her returning a dress may believe that she has subtly signaled that the 
dress was too small, without using an outright lie to avoid this embarrassing fact. Indeed, in 
some interaction settings, evasion maybe perceived as a social signal that the conversation 
should move to less uncomfortable topics. Future investigations could examine the perceived 
morality of evasion versus deception, and the possibility that, in some cases, evasion facilitates 
teamwork among those who are motivated to manage impressions of self and other (Goffman 
1959). Such teamwork may be particularly critical in consumer interactions with firm employees, 
where employees must obtain factual information from the customer while avoiding their 
potential embarrassment (e.g. loan interviews, restaurant and other service interactions). In a 
similar vein, prior research has found consumers’ willingness to disclose their personal 
information to relationship-seeking marketers for customized benefits is greater when the 
information is privacy-related, but consumers are reluctant to disclose embarrassing information 
to firms whom they have built relationships with (White, 2004). 
Our findings also suggest that ease of detection by observers may be another factor that 
differentially motivates evasion versus deception. While rates of deception detection among lay 
people are no better than chance (DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter1985; Vrij and Graham 1997), 
researchers have devised ways to improve evasion detection (Buller et al. 1991; Rogers and 
Norton 2011). We found that the persistence of an inquirer affects evasive, but not deceptive 
responding, possibly because probing facilitates detection of evasion (Buller et al. 1991; 
Burgoon et al. 1994) but not deception (Buller et al. 1989). On the other hand, our findings of 
discreditability as a moderator of deception (but not evasion), suggest that failure may be more 
costly for deceivers than evaders. People are ashamed of being caught telling lies (Keltner and 
Buswell 1996), and the facade of a false reality can be challenging to sustain over time (Buller et 
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al. 1991). Overall, it appears that deceptive responses are easier to construct, harder to maintain, 
harder to detect, and more damaging if discovered. 
Depending on how narrowly one defines deception, the popular conception of the “lie of 
omission” is either a special case of evasion or a hybrid approach that blurs the boundary 
between deception and evasion (i.e., an evasive response that prompts deceptive inferences). 
Consistent with our focus on evasion as an alternative to, rather than a means of deception, we 
constructed scenarios to limit opportunities for “lies of omission” and leveraged measures to 
capture the evasive intentions of communicators, while ignoring the inferences made by message 
recipients. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that telling lies of omission can be a way of 
deceiving others without the psychological pain of presenting false information, especially if 
consumers have a restrictive view of deception. Further research is needed for a better 
understanding of this specific type of deception.  
In conclusion, this research empirically introduces evasion as a significant and often 
preferred alternative to deception and contributes theory-driven insights on the behavioral and 
psychological differences between these two alternatives to the truth. We hope this work will 
stimulate further inquiries into the evasive maneuvers made by people on the everyday 
battleground of self-presentation.  
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CHAPTER II 
Self-Presenter’s Paradox?  
Downstream Consequences of Non-truthful Communication 
 
In an information exchange context that involves self-presentation, the content of 
information (‘what’) often directly affects audience’s social perception of presenter. As 
frequently, the manner in which the presenter communicates the information (‘how’) exerts 
influence on the perception by the audience. Accordingly, how the presenter is perceived often 
provoke different reactions from the audience as a result of the social interaction, depending on 
the accuracy or ambiguity of the information involved in the interaction. This difference in 
audience reaction deserves special attention, especially in interactions that involve economic 
consequences. 
One such interaction is service provider–customer interaction. Service providers are 
compensated by an additional source of income other than wages: gratuity. Customers determine 
the amount of gratuity after their interactions with the service providers. Within those 
interactions, information the service providers convey to the customers shapes the perception of 
the service providers, and thereby impacts the economic return for the service providers. 
Accordingly, service providers often face a situation where they need to make strategic choices 
with regards to what information to share with the customers and how to share it. What happens, 
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specifically when the service providers need to deal with information regarding an inconvenience 
to the customer? 
In this chapter, we delve into the consequences that different approaches of 
communicating information (i.e., evasion or deception in comparison to truth-telling) can bring, 
in addition to observing the presenter’s tendency to engage in each of the tactics, particularly 
when the communication involves unfavorable information. 
 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.1 Non-truthful Interpersonal Communication and Its Consequences 
When it comes to social interactions, it is almost hard to argue that a single action from 
an actor can be considered free from the concerns of how the self would be viewed by the 
interaction partner. Goffman (1959) suggested that when an individual comes in contact with 
other people, the individual will attempt to control or guide the impression that others might 
make of him/her by changing or fixing his/her setting, appearance, and manner as actors are on 
stage in front of the audiences who try to form impressions and obtain information about that 
individual. Such endeavors of individuals communicating some information about themselves to 
others are called self-presentation (e.g., Baumeister, 1982). 
Despite the ubiquity of self-presentational motives, how much individuals participate in 
conscious attempts at or putting efforts into self-presentations (impression motivation), how 
skillful they are at it (impression efficacy), and the means they use to engage in self-presentation 
vary to a great extent (Snyder, 1974; Wooten & Reed, 2000). Hence, researchers have devoted 
significant efforts to classify self-presentational behaviors and construct an integrative taxonomy 
of such behaviors (Tedeschi & Lindskold, 1976; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985; Arkin, 1981). An 
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important dimension emerged from the classification of self-presentation, demonstrating a 
person's efforts to look good as opposed to efforts to “not look bad” (Arkin, 1981; Olson & 
Johnson, 1991; Roth, Snyder, & Pace, 1986). As much as individuals try to construct messages 
within communication to present the self in a favorable light (cf. Berger 2014), individuals are 
motivated to avoid looking bad in the eyes of others. This motive often underlies non-truthful 
self-presentation.  
Prior literature has extensively examined deception as a common response to requests for 
self-threatening information within social interaction to avoid presenting the self unfavorably 
(Argo, Dahl & White 2011; Argo, White, & Dahl 2006; Sengupta, Dahl, & Gorn 2002). In 
attempts to recognize the antecedents of lying, DePaulo et al. (1996) examined diary entries of 
individuals and found out that some ‘liars’ engage in deceptive behavior to be protected from 
negative outcomes, such as embarrassment and disapproval. However, deception is often 
regarded to negatively affect one’s own perceptions of the moral self (Bok, 2011; Mazar, On, & 
Ariely 2008), and even “innocent” white lies have been studied to have undesirable personal and 
social consequences (Argo & Shiv, 2012).  
We suggests an alternative measure, noting the fact that the structure of prior research 
might have forced participants to decide their responses in terms of lying or not. When 
individuals encounter a situation that might embarrass them or the other person, they need not 
form their responses in regards to either lying or not lying. Instead, they might intentionally 
withhold some information as a strategy to break away from such situations. Communications 
researchers, as well as consumer researchers suggested evasion as an appealing means to which 
communicators can resort when neither lying nor truth-telling is an attractive option to achieve 
one’s self-presentational goal (Burgoon, Buller, Gurrero, Afifi, & Feldman, 1996; Carlson, 
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George, Burgoon, Adams, & White, 2004). By minimally disclosing information about oneself 
(Snell, 1989) or by remaining silent in social interactions (Cheek & Buss, 1981; Meleshko & 
Alden, 1993; Pilkonis, 1977), one gives others little opportunity for criticizing oneself and 
therefore the risk of negative evaluation is reduced (Schlenker & Leary, 1985). In this vein, we 
have also argued that, consumers, rather than telling an outright lie, often share unflattering 
consumption information in an evasive manner in the first chapter of this dissertation. It argues 
that evasion is viewed as a tactic that offers a more acceptable means of avoiding unfavorable 
truths than deception, without involving too much severity of emotional consequences of feeling 
guilt and shame. Despite the potential benefits that evasive communication might entail, evasion 
may not necessarily lead to successful attainment of one’s goal in social interaction. 
The objective of this chapter is to acknowledge this possibility and to establish boundary 
conditions to the general conception of evasion being a ‘preferable’ alternative to deception in 
truth avoidance. We attempt to advance the understandings of evasion as a commonly used tactic 
to manage disclosures of information that might present one’s self in an unfavorable light, by 
investigating downstream consequences in comparison with deception. We explore, in particular, 
socio-economic consequences of these non-truthful communications to the communicator and to 
the recipient. Recent efforts have started to shed light on the social consequences of evasion. 
Roger and Norton (2011) suggested that the manner in which a speaker delivers a piece of 
information impacts the social perception of the speaker. More recently, Bickart et al. (2015) 
examined the tendency to engage in non-truthful communication of salespersons and how it 
influenced not only the social perception (more specifically, trustworthiness and competence) of 
the speaker but also the outcome variable that is relevant to economic returns to the speaker (i.e., 
sales potential). 
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2.1.2 Engaging in Non-truthful Information Sharing for Others 
To avoid feeling embarrassed or to protect your self-image from being hurt, individuals 
might misrepresent or conceal information about their performance when responding to the 
request of unfavorable information. On the other hand, would they as likely be willing to engage 
in non-truthful communication even when the inconvenient truth is about other person, out of 
concerns for the other person’s feelings?  
“Just as the member of any group is expected to have self- respect, so also he is expected 
to sustain a standard of considerateness; he is expected to go to certain lengths to save the 
feelings and the face of others present, and he is expected to do this willingly and spontaneously 
because of emotional identification with the others and with their feelings,” Goffman suggests in 
one of his essays (1967). In this vein, research has documented deceptive behaviors of 
individuals that are benefitting others, wherein people lie to be polite, to ensure that a social 
interaction runs smoothly, or to protect another person’s feelings (Argo & Shiv, 2012; Argo, 
Dahl, & White, 2011; Brown & Levinson, 1987). For example, previous research (Schlenker & 
Britt 1999) investigated individuals’ efforts to assist others maintaining their self-image and 
coined the term ‘strategic identity support,’ and Argo et al., 2011 suggested that individuals 
would not only lie to the other person when you are motivated to avoid being embarrassed, but 
also are likely to be motivated to lie for the other person to manage other person’s impression or 
public self-image (deceptive strategic identity support), particularly when they were motivated to 
protect (rather than to enhance) the other person’s identity.   
We attempt to extend this literature in search for a more fulsome understanding of how 
individuals would actually support other person’s identity maintenance in a strategic manner. 
While other-oriented deception may be employed, individuals should not engage in deception to 
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the extent that will sacrifice one’s self-interest. Therefore, evasive approach could deem 
appropriate and/or attractive to bypass the risk of jeopardizing self or the other when dealing 
with inconvenient truth.  
 
2.1.3 Self-Presenter’s Paradox 
While self-presenters are mainly concerned as to how their behaviors could influence 
how their public self-image or the social perception from the audience, they should also be 
cognizant about diverse types of downstream consequences. However, what they might expect as 
a consequence of engaging in such behaviors may not always be in line with what the reality 
brings them. We conjecture that this mismatch is prevalent in social interactions. While an 
evasive communicator might expect favorable response from the recipient as he/she dodges from 
potentially self-threatening information, the recipient may not welcome the seemingly 
fragmented information. This theorizing builds onto the notion of ‘the presenter’s paradox’ 
(Weaver, Garcia, & Schwarz, 2012), which refers to a tendency to incorrectly estimate 
evaluator's perspective when selecting information to present. In Weaver et al.’s study, 
presenters employ additive strategy and thus try to include all favorable information whereas 
evaluators take a holistic approach and show a weighted averaging pattern. As a result, when a 
presenter includes a mildly favorable information is added, it dilutes the impact of highly 
favorable information, which leads to a less optimal outcome.  
We test the extent to which the presenter's paradox extends to the protective self-
presentation that deals with unfavorable, negative information. While the paradox has been 
discussed in terms of decision to include or exclude more or less favorable information in the 
self-presentation, we seek to demonstrate a relevance of this paradox that avoiding to present 
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unfavorable information altogether in hopes to maintain favorable response from the audience 
may, in some cases, backfire. However, we further attempt to find a potential remedy to this 
paradox. 
 
2.2 THE CURRENT WORK 
The majority of this chapter is devoted to investigation of whether a specific self-
presentation tactic (i.e., evasion, deception, or truth-telling) preferred by a waitperson (i.e., self-
presenter) would lead to maximizing one’s own (financial) gain. That is, is a particular self-
presentation favored by the server necessarily well-received by customers?  
Exploring customer responses to the different types of self-presentation of the servers 
also provide insights regarding the implications for the audience. We investigate how the two 
tactics differentially affect future decision-making on resource allocation (e.g., tipping behavior 
and further information search behavior). Not only the reactions from the audience are different 
but also what the audience takes away from the interaction could diverge as a function of 
different communication tactic that the presenter uses. 
Lastly, the current work intends to explore the possibility and consequences of engaging 
in less-than-truthful communications in the interest of others. Although the traditional 
perspective of self-presentation views non-truthful self-presentation as a strategic tactic to 
protect one’s own self, a few recent works consider Goffman (1967)’s discussion on norms of 
other-considerateness and self-respect to argue that individuals might also engage in non-truthful 
communications when they are motivated to prevent other people from being harmed by the 
exposure of unfavorable information. Evasion, just as certain types of deception, can be other-
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benefitting. Instances and consequences of other-benefitting evasion are empirically examined 
and discussed in this chapter.  
In short, the goal of this research is to extend the recent research efforts that have started 
to shed light on understanding the phenomenon and theoretical background for non-truthful 
information managing, and we accomplish this task by investigating the downstream 
consequences of those tactics in a waitperson-customer interaction, which is a consumption 
setting in which self-presentational missteps may have economic outcomes. We draw on the 
approach of examining ‘the presenter’s paradox’ to argue that the expectations of the information 
provider as a function of in what manner he/she communicates the information might not be in 
accordance with how favorably the audience responds to the information sharing. Finally, we 
explore the possibility that the paradoxical choice of the self-presenter might prove itself to be 
the rewarding and worthwhile when given consideration of the underlying motives.    
In the sections to follow, we present a series of studies to demonstrate that evasive 
communication commonly takes place in the marketplace, particularly within waitperson-
customer interaction context. In the tradition of other research on social interactions, we 
investigate the perspectives of both parties that are involved in non-truthful information sharing. 
To ensure that the both ends of the interaction have actually engaged in evasive communication, 
we report brief findings from pilot tests then move on to report and discuss findings from 
laboratory studies. Pilot A and study 1 examine the viewpoint of service providers (i.e., self-
presenter) and shows potential evidence of their efforts to make ‘strategic’ choices of how to 
share information. Then, pilot B and study 2 investigate how the audience actually responds to 
the contents and the manner of information sharing, using tip amount as a proxy for the 
expressed favorability towards the information provider, and by asking them to indicate how 
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they are willing to engage in further information search. Furthermore, downstream consequences 
of additional information gathering about non-truthful communication and how the revelation of 
truth impacts consumer responses are tested and discussed. 
 
2.3 SERVER’S PERSPECTIVE 
2.3.1 Pilot A 
When customers experience an inconvenience at a service establishment, they often 
demand an explanation, an apology, or other means to compensate for their experience. In those 
cases, a normatively appropriate behavior from the service provider is to correctly identify the 
cause of the inconvenience and share the information with the customer. However, to avoid 
looking bad in front of the eyes of the customer, the self-presenters (i.e., servers) might dodge 
away from the normatively appropriate communication (i.e., truth-telling). Admission of one’s 
own mistake can result in negative perception about the server’s competence (Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002).  Blaming the kitchen might withdraw the customers as witnessing the 
instance of other-blame often threatens assumptions about justice and personal invulnerability 
(Tenner & Affleck, 1990). In the first pilot, the extent of non-truthful information sharing in the 
existence of customer inconvenience was measured from the perspective of the waitpersons.  
The pilot testing was conducted mainly to demonstrate the prevalence of evasion in the 
marketplace, to provide evidence that it is a commonly used tactic by service providers. To reach 
this objective, real-world experiences of restaurant servers were recalled in the pilot study. 
 
Method 
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A total of 165 participants (104 females) were recruited online through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (cf. Goodman, Cryder & Cheema, 2012). Notably, study participation was 
limited only to the participants who reported that they either had an experience of working as a 
server at a restaurant or are currently employed as one. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two conditions, where they were asked to think of a time when they had to deal with any 
customer inconvenience that was caused by own or other person’s mistake while they were 
serving a customer. We asked the participants to explain what the customer inconvenience was 
about, but more importantly, to provide an open-ended response to the question that asks how 
they verbally communicated with the customer about the inconvenience, to the best of their 
memory.  
Two independent coders who were blind to the hypotheses of this research were provided 
with a classification schemes for the responses. An inter-coder reliability check was completed 
for the 165 cases. The two raters agreed on 135 of 165 cases (81.8%), suggesting high levels of 
inter-coder reliability (Weber, 1990). Disagreement between the two raters occurred primarily 
because one tended to take the written responses more literally than the other rater; a third coder 
reconciled the disagreements.  
 
Results 
Among participants who recalled how they dealt with customer inconvenience that was 
caused by themselves, being truthful about one’s own fault seemed to be the most common 
response (49.4%). We also found out that being evasive about one’s own mistake is as common 
as telling the truth (45.8% vs. 49.4%; χ2(1) = 0.22, p = .64). 
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On the other hand, we found that service providers were less likely to be forthcoming 
when it comes to revealing the fact that other party caused the customer inconvenience (18.3%) 
than admitting their own mistakes (49.4%; χ2(1) = 17.80, p = .00003). In fact, evasive responses 
were most widely used when servers provide explanation about customer inconveniences caused 
by other party (76.8% vs. 23.2%; χ2(1) = 47.22, p < .00001). Table 2.1 presents response option 
counts and proportions for both conditions (Omnibus χ2(3) = 20.78, p = .00012). 
 
TABLE 2.1 
RESPONSE TYPE (PILOT A) 
              
    Condition 
  Self  Other 
       
Truth 
 
41 (49.4%) 
 
15 (18.3%) 
Deception 
 
4 (4.8%) 
 
4 (4.9%) 
Excuse 
Non-answer 
 
12 
26 
(14.5%) 
(31.3%) 
 
11 
52 
(13.4%) 
(63.4%) 
       Total 
 
83 (100%) 
 
82 (100%) 
              
 
 
With sizable proportion of former or current servers actually reporting that they have 
engaged in some form of non-truthful communication with the customers to avoid disclosing 
unfavorable information, we further conducted a couple of experiments to seek converging 
evidence in a more controlled lab setting. 
 
2.3.2 STUDY 1A 
Study 1A was designed to examine the perspectives of self-presenters, by observing the 
choices participants make regarding how to share unfavorable information when they engage in 
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communications with the audience. The choice that a self-presenter makes on how to share 
information brings a significant impact on how the self-presenter is perceived by the audience, 
and it shapes further interaction between the self-presenter and the audience, which might 
involve economic outcomes. 
When a service failure takes place at a service establishment, how would a service 
provider communicate with the customer to make up for the failure? We surveyed the question 
from the service providers’ perspective within a context of a restaurant where there was a 
mistake in food preparation for the customer and examine the servers’ intentions to engage in 
non-truthful communication.  
 
2.3.2.1 Design and Procedure  
One hundred and fifty-three participants were recruited via paid community panel at the 
University of Michigan and received cash payment for their participation. Participants were 
presented with one of two versions of a hypothetical scenario, where they, as servers, were to 
handle information about a customer inconvenience (see appendix 2B for scenario). The 
customer inconvenience of having unwanted sauce on the food was either caused by the server 
(self-fault condition) or by the inattention of the kitchen (other-fault condition). At the end of the 
scenario, the customer noticed the mistake and demanded an explanation. 
Once they have read the scenario, participants were asked to indicate which of the 
following statements best describes how they would respond to the customers at the table: (1) I 
would apologize and blame myself for the mistake, (2) I would apologize and blame the kitchen 
for the mistake, (3) I would apologize but not be specific about who made the mistake, or (4) I 
would apologize but give an irrelevant excuse like “it’s been a bad day” (order counterbalanced).  
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Choosing responses (1) or (2) was an indication of willingness to provide either truthful 
or deceptive explanation, while responses (3) and (4) were included to represent the evasive 
explanation for both conditions. 1 
 
2.3.2.2 Results and Discussion  
Participant responses were recoded according to the assigned conditions (i.e., self- vs. 
other-fault conditions) for analyses. For instance, if a participant in the self-fault condition had 
chosen the response option of blaming the kitchen, the response was categorized as deception.  
Depending on who caused the mistake, there was a significant difference in the 
distribution of the responses that the participants who took the perspective of the servers would 
provide to the customer (Omnibus χ2(2) = 15.96; p = 0.0003). The detailed pattern of the 
distribution replicated what was observed in the pilot study. When the customer inconvenience 
happened as a result of one’s own mistake, admitting one’s own fault was as frequent an option 
as being inexplicit about the source of the mistake (44.6% vs. 53.0%; χ2(1) = 1.18; p = 0.277). 
On the contrary, when participants were to deal with the mistake that was caused by other party 
(i.e., kitchen), their intentions to pinpoint the correct source was significantly reduced (18.6% vs. 
44.6%; χ2(1) = 16.38; p = 0.001), highlighting the evasive responses to appear as the most 
common approach above other types of information sharing (χ2(1) = 16.46; p = 0.00005) to 
handle negative information regarding customer inconvenience. See table 2.2. 
 
 
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1"Although I expected to conduct further analyses for the different types of evasion based on pilot study 
results and prior literature that suggested that even irrelevant excuses can assist communicator to reach 
their communication goal (i.e., Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978), the tally of those ‘irrelevant excuse’ 
responses was too small to conduct a meaningful statistical analysis. Therefore, further analyses treat non-
answer and excuse categories as a single response type. "
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TABLE 2.2 
RESPONSE TYPE (STUDY 1A) 
  
          
 Self  Kitchen 
       
Truth 
 
37 (44.6%) 
 
13 (18.6%) 
Deception 
 
2 (2.4%) 
 
10 (14.3%)2 
Non-answer 
Excuse 
 
42 
2 
(50.6%) 
(2.4%) 
 
46 
1 
(65.7%) 
(1.4%) 
       Total 
 
83 (100%) 
 
70 (100%) 
              
 
 
2.3.3 STUDY 1B 
Study 1A sought to understand the perspectives of self-presenters by asking participants 
to indicate how they would communicate unfavorable information to the audience. While 
evasive communication was most commonly used, servers were more likely to truthfully 
communicate their mistakes than forthcoming about other people’s mistake. Extending the 
findings of study 1A, study 1B considers if the self-presenters would modify their behaviors 
when it is more salient that their financial outcomes are at stake. How do service providers (i.e., 
self-presenters) recruit different types of non-truthful measures in communications to customers 
(i.e., audience of the self-presentation) in an unfavorable social situation with regards to 
maximizing their financial incentives? 
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
2"One of the counterintuitive results from this study was that while the proportion of participant reporting 
they would escape the inconvenience of admitting their own fault in front of customers by blaming the 
kitchen was negligible (2.4% vs. 0; Fisher’s p = 0.49), a significant number of participants who were to 
handle information about the kitchen’s fault rather took the responsibility themselves (14.3% vs. 0; χ2(1) 
= 10.77; p = 0.001). Perhaps this can be partially attributed to each of (or the combination of) the 
following factors: (1) a lack of severity in the mistake or an ease of suggesting a remedy, or (2) the 
perception of a cooperative, team-work setting and the extent to which one feels responsible for the 
mistake in such a setting. 
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2.3.3.1 Design and Procedure  
Four hundred forty-one (170 female) participants were recruited via online panel and 
provided data in return for a small cash payment. Participants were randomly assigned to read 
one of four versions of a hypothetical scenario, while taking perspective of a waitperson (see 
appendix 2C for stimuli). The scenario this time involved a lengthy delay at a restaurant, for 
which the waitperson inevitably needed to apologize and provide explanation to customer(s). In 
the scenario, two factors were manipulated. First, to explore the interplay between the impacts of 
the content and the manner of the sharing of unfavorable information, I manipulated the delay to 
be coming either from server’s own mistake or the kitchen’s, as in the previous studies. An 
additional factor of financial incentive structure (i.e., whether the waitperson’s compensation 
with tips from customers is fixed or not) was manipulated to examine the extent to which the 
self-presenter strategically alters the choice of information management tactics in consideration 
of downstream consequences (e.g., financial reasons in this context). 
As in study 1A, upon reading the scenarios, participants were asked to indicate which of 
the following statements best describes what they would say to the customers: (1) I would 
apologize and blame myself for the mistake, (2) I would apologize and blame the kitchen for the 
mistake, or (3) I would apologize but not blame anyone for the mistake (note the irrelevant 
excuse option was dropped from study 1A; order counterbalanced).  
 
2.3.3.2 Results  
Source effect. Overall, there was a significant source effect on the distribution of the most 
likely response that participants would provide to the customer who asks about the reason for the 
delay (Omnibus χ 2(2) = 39.86; p < 0.00001). Participants were mostly truthful when they 
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communicated the information regarding the delay that was caused due to their own fault (within 
self-fault condition: truth 61% vs. non-truthful tactics 39%, χ 2(1) = 21.14; p < 0.00001). On the 
contrary, when they needed to speak of the kitchen’s fault, the pattern flipped. They indicated 
that they are much less likely to be straightforward when communicating information about 
other’s fault (within kitchen condition: truth 31% vs. non-truthful tactics 69%, χ 2(1) = 61.79; p < 
0.00001). Among the non-truthful responses, evasive responses were used significantly more 
than deceptive responses regardless of the source of the delay, replicating the findings from 
Chapter 1 (Full sample χ 2(1) = 194.82; p < 0.00001). This preference towards evasion, 
nonetheless, was more prevalent when participants were to deal with other party’s mistake, to the 
degree in which it even outnumbered the tendency to favor communicating information in 
truthful manner (within kitchen condition: truth 31% vs. evasion 62%, χ 2(1) = 41.66; p < 
0.00001). See table 2.3a. 
TABLE 2.3: 
MOST LIKELY EXPLANATION REGARDING DELAY (STUDY 1B) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial incentive structure effect. The extent to which differences in financial incentive 
structure affects the truthfulness of the responses was not as strong compared to the source effect 
(Omnibus χ 2(2) = 5.31; p = 0.07). Yet, the financial incentive structure had a significant impact 
2.3a  Source 
Conditions 
 Self Kitchen 
   
Truthful 
 
133 (61.0%) 70 (31.4%) 
Deceptive  12 (5.5%) 15 (6.7%) 
Evasive 
 
73 (33.5%) 138 (61.8%) 
  
 
Total 
 
 218 (100%) 223 (100%) 
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on the rate of truth-telling among participants, such that participants who were assigned to the 
condition in which the tip amount they receive depends solely on the customer’s decision (i.e., 
high incentive condition: HIC) were less likely to provide truthful explanation for the delay than 
the participants who would receive fixed percentage of the food bill as tips (i.e., low incentive 
condition: LIC) (rate of truthful responses: HIC 40% vs. LIC 51%, χ 2(1) = 4.73; p = 0.03; see 
table 2.3b).  We decomposed the results to verify that the truth-tellers in the self-fault condition 
were indeed impacted by the differences in the financial incentive structure. Albeit the truthful 
response was the most prevalent response among participants responsible for the delay, they 
became much less willing to admit their responsibility when their partners were perceived to be 
in greater power to affect how much they receive as compensation (rate of truthful responses 
within self-fault condition: HIC 52% vs. LIC 68%, χ 2(1) =5.48; p = 0.019; see table 2.3c). 
TABLE 2.3: 
STUDY 1B: MOST LIKELY EXPLANATION REGARDING DELAY 
(b: BY INCENTIVE STRUCTURE; c: SELF-FAULT CONDITION) 
 
 
 
2.3.3.3 Discussion 
By asking how participants would choose to communicate unfavorable information with 
others and analyzing their responses, we again found empirical support to the theorizing that 
2.3b Incentive 
conditions High Low 
 
  
Truthful 
 
78 (40.2%) 125(50.6%) 
Deceptive  15 (7.7%) 12 (4.9%) 
Evasive 
 
101 (52.1%)  110 (44.5%) 
  
 
Total 
 
194 (100%) 247 (100%) 
     
2.3c Incentive 
conditions High Low 
 
  
Truthful    49 (52.1%) 84 (67.7%) 
Deceptive 8 (8.5%) 4 (3.2%) 
Evasive 37 (39.4%) 36 (29.0%) 
   Total 94 (100%)   124 (100%) 
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evasion is a preferred alternative to deception among individuals who are reluctant to reveal the 
truthful yet inconvenient information. While participants were more honest about admitting their 
own responsibility in a social mishap, they seemed to be uneasy going public with the 
information about other people’s mistake. However, we demonstrated that this greater tendency 
to disclose one’s own mistake (vs. a third party’s mistake) in an unfavorable situation is 
mitigated once the financial stakes are more closely involved within the social interaction. This 
provides suggestive evidence that the presenters of information are taking into account the 
downstream social consequences when they are making choice of how to best handle potentially 
self-threatening information. Pilot B and Study 2 examines the extent to which such 
considerations of downstream consequences are worthwhile and relevant, by directly testing 
customer responses to the self-presentational efforts.    
 
2.4 CUSTOMER’S PERSPECTIVE 
2.4.1 Pilot B 
The second part of the chapter was devoted to examine the customer responses to the 
communications of servers. First, a quick pilot study was conducted to assess the accessibility of 
customers to recall their experiences of non-truthful communications in their interaction with 
service providers. In doing so, a categorization of the communications with regards to two 
dimensions of non-truthfulness was attempted. The two dimensions of interest were: (i) if the 
communication lacks clarity (i.e., evasion vs. other answers) or (ii) if the communication lacks 
veracity (e.g., deception vs. truth). Finally, the second pilot served as a feasibility check for using 
tip amounts as the main dependent variable in study 2. 
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Method 
Two hundred and twenty-seven participants were recruited via an online panel under a 
restriction that they must reside in North America (i.e., USA or Canada), where customers 
normally leave the gratuity to service providers at the end of the service encounter. Their ages 
ranged from 18 to 72 years (49.8% female). Participants were told in advance to consider 
participating in the study only if they have had experienced an unpleasant incident at a restaurant 
to help better reach the study objective. They were also informed that they will be asked a 
several questions regarding what they remembered about the experience. To ensure the 
maximum accessibility in memory to those events, participants were asked to think and write 
down about the last time they had an unsatisfactory experience at a service establishment (e.g., 
long delay for the order, overcooked food, etc.), particularly at a restaurant. They were to provide 
open-ended responses to briefly explain what happened (i.e., what the customer inconvenience 
they experienced was) and whom they thought was responsible for the inconvenience.  
FIGURE 2.1 
RECALLING SERVER COMMUNICATION (CUSTOMER’S PERSPECTIVE: PILOT B) 
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Then, they were asked to answer a series of binary questions to identify the perceived 
type of the communication with the server (figure 2.1). The questions were used to capture how 
the customers had perceived the communication provided by the servers to be, rather than the 
actual nature of the communication. 
Finally, they were asked to indicate if the communication with the server made them 
reconsider their willingness to leave the tip or the amount of it. 
 
Results 
Overall, we observe that the distribution of actual responses recalled by customers is 
similar to that of the self-reported communication types captured in the first part of the pilot 
testing which examined the perspective of the servers. This suggests that the audience perceives 
the actor’s non-truthful communication rather accurately as a deviance from a truthful 
information exchange. Not only do the servers admit that they would largely engage in evasion 
while communicating inconvenient situational information within their interactions with 
customers, but the customers can also readily recall their experiences in receiving an evasive 
communication from the servers. When participants were guided to identify the category of 
communication they received about an inconvenience they experienced at a restaurant, a 
majority (about 70%) of the participants (N = 140) reported that they were not provided with an 
explanation for the inconvenience. This result shows that servers incline to avoid providing 
explanation, and furthermore, the non-trivial counts of responses not given even at times when 
they were directly asked by customers (N = 31) imply that the customers are aware of the fact 
that the servers often engage in avoidant communication (i.e., a type of evasion) when dealing 
with information regarding customer inconvenience.  
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TABLE 2.4 
RESPONSE TYPE (PILOT B) 
 
  Asked  Not asked 
       Truth 
 
30 (40.0%) 
 
15 (9.9%) 
Deception 
 
3 (4.0%) 
 
2 (1.3%) 
Vague answer  
Non-answer 
 
11 
31 
(14.7%) 
(41.3%) 
 
6 
129 
(3.9%) 
(84.9%) 
       Total 
 
75 (100%) 
 
152 (100%) 
              
 
A separate analysis on influence on tip amount was conducted to gauge whether using tip 
amounts as an indication of customers’ favorability towards the receiving of different types of 
communications. Prior literature on tipping behavior suggests that many factors other than 
service quality, including individual differences such as conformity to norms, influence tip 
amounts (Conlin, Lynn, & O’Donoghue, 2003), and thus, this should in fact be a conservative 
approach. By simply comparing the extent to which the different types of communication 
influenced the willingness to leave tip or the amount of it, we found that the different types of 
non-truthful communications could result in meaningful differences in tipping behavior (χ2(3) = 
10.72, p = .013). Further, when we examined the effect of definite answer versus evasive answer, 
customers were more likely to reconsider their intentions to provide tip when they receive an 
indefinite responding than definite answers (68% vs. 52%, χ2(1) = 4.57, p = .032). More 
specifically, among the conversations that actually took place, customers who thought they 
received an evasion communication from the servers reported that they had reconsidered the tip 
amount and their willingness to give, whereas customers who perceived their communication to 
be truthful reported that they did not reconsider their tip after the conversation. Based on these 
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observations, therefore, we gain support for using tip amounts as a proxy to measure customer 
attitude towards the communication in the main study.  
TABLE 2.5 
COMMUNICATION INFLUENCING TIP (PILOT B) 
              
  YES NO  Total 
       Truth 
 
21 (14%) 24 (30%) 
 
45 (19.8%) 
Deception 
 
5 (3%) 0 (0%) 
 
5 (2.2%) 
Vague answer  
Non-answer 
 
13 (9%) 
108 (73%) 
4 (5%) 
52 (65%) 
 
17 (7.5%) 
160 (70.5%) 
     
  
Total 
 
147 (100%) 80 (100%)
 
227 (100%) 
            
 
Finally, a laboratory study was conducted to explore how the customers respond to 
servers that use non-truthful maneuvers in communication to handle information about customer 
inconveniences. 
 
2.4.2 STUDY 2 
Studies conducted to understand the server’s perspective, whether recalled or imagined, 
collectively showed that while servers tend to be more truthful about admitting their own fault, a 
sizable portion of the responses were provided in an evasive manner. Also, this evasive approach 
appeared to be the most frequently chosen option when the servers were to communicate the 
fault of other party. That is, servers were motivated to protect the kitchen from negative 
evaluations as well, rather than being blunt about the kitchen’s fault. However, whether these 
efforts would necessarily result in consequences that are beneficial to the waitperson is 
questionable and further leads to other relevant questions. Is taking an evasive approach more 
advantageous than a deceptive (or honest) approach in maximizing their financial incentives? 
Moreover, do the two non-truthful communication tactics, when detected, trigger similar 
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audience responses (i.e., which tactic is riskier when detected)? Then, how do self-serving 
motives that underlie the non-truthful information sharing impact audience responses? As such, 
consideration of social consequences (i.e., audience responses) is warranted for more fulsome 
understanding of non-truthful information sharing. 
If we turn back to the pilot study B, not only did the results show that customers readily 
recall instances where their communications with restaurant servers were evasive in manner (i.e., 
avoidant or vague), but the results also suggest that those customers are generally not favorable 
towards the evasive communication, that they were more likely to report that the communication 
influenced the willingness to leave tip or the amount of it. Given this general reluctance to accept 
evasive communication from the audience, it is worthwhile to delve deeper into the seemingly 
paradoxical preference towards evasion in the current study. 
 The purpose of Study 2 is to examine various consequences of different tactics of 
information sharing by examining the responses of the audience. More specifically, the 
experiment is designed to serve a three-folds objective: (1) exploring initial responses of 
audience to different types of non-truthful information management tactics in determining tip 
amounts (which often constitutes a significant proportion of financial incentives that the service 
provider would receive), (2) investigating the role of perceived informativeness and believability 
of the tactics to observe the differences in willingness to search for additional (and potentially 
more truthful) information, and (3) testing the degree to which, if at all, the audience perceives 
and responds favorably to the non-truthfulness of evasion and deception in relation to their 
underlying motives to serve self vs. other.  
 
2.4.2.1 Design and Procedure 
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In this experiment, we asked participants to take the perspectives of customers to capture 
how customers respond to the different self-presentations of service providers, using tipping 
behavior as proxy for customer responses. Two hundred and twenty-nine (107 female) 
participants successfully completed the study.  
The study followed a two-part procedure. In the first part of the study, participants were 
exposed to a scenario similar to what was used in study 1B, but it was organized to represent a 
perspective of a customer who experienced a lengthy delay at a restaurant. In the last lines of the 
scenario, the participants received one of three responses to their direct inquiry regarding the 
source of delay: the server blames oneself, blames the kitchen, or does not provides any 
explanations for who caused the delay. Then, the participants were asked to complete the 
following sets of dependent measures: (1) A question provoking an open-ended response about 
the percentage of total food bill that they would like to leave as a tip after receiving the 
waitperson’s explanation, (2) scale-based measures to evaluate the response provided in two 
dimensions of believability (2 items) and informativeness (3 items), and finally, they were asked 
to indicate (3) their willingness to seek for further information (2 items). 
After the participants indicated their likelihood of engaging in further information search, 
they were instructed to complete the second part of the study. This portion of the experiment was 
designed to explore more consequential downstream effects of non-truthful information sharing 
in the context of when the truth is revealed. Participants were presented with another short 
scenario in which the restaurant manager comes out to apologize and communicate information 
about the (true) source of the delay that took place earlier. This information would either confirm 
or reject the original information provided by the waitperson, or update the customer(s) with the 
motives of the previous non-answer by the waitperson. Participants were finally asked to indicate 
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the tip amount that they would then like to leave, to examine the extent to which they would 
change the amount from what they had stated initially. 
 
2.4.2.2 Results and Discussion  
Phase 1 
Main results. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the data, with response type 
as the single factor, revealed a significant main effect on the tip amount dependent variable. The 
amount of tip left by the customers differed significantly depending on the response provided by 
the waitperson (Omnibus F (2, 226) = 4.51, p = 0.012). More specifically, pairwise contrasts 
reveal that customers indicated willingness to leave higher tip when the response from the 
waitperson directed the source of the delay to be the kitchen (Mkitchen = 13.64) than when they 
were told that it was the waitperson’s fault (Mwaitperson = 12.18; p = 0.066), also than when the 
waitperson did not provide any explanations (Mno_explanation = 11.28; p = 0.003; see figure 2.2). 
Waitpersons taking up the responsibility for the delay did not result in tip amount any higher 
than when they were mute about the fact (12.18 vs. 11.28; p = 0.263).  
FIGURE 2.2 
INITIAL RESPONSES TO SERVER’S COMMUNICATIONS (STUDY 2) 
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79 
"
Evaluation of responses. Customers evaluated the response from the waitperson in terms 
of how informative it was (3 items; α = .937) and how believable it was (2 items; α = .935). 
Customers rated the responses that specifically told who the source of delay was to be much 
higher in both dimensions than the response that did not, although saying that it was the 
waitperson’s fault was evaluated significantly more informative and believable than blaming the 
kitchen. (ps < 0.01 for all Omnibus ANOVA and pairwise contrasts; see figure 2.3 for mean 
values). 
FIGURE 2.3 
EVALUATION OF RESPONSES (STUDY 2) 
 
 
Likelihood of further information search. Results show that customers who could not 
explicitly figure out where the delay was coming from by the waitperson’s response were more 
likely to engage in further information seeking activities (Mno_explanation = 6.41) than those who 
received the information about the source (Mkitchen = 4.51, Mwaitperson = 3.32; ps < 0.001). Among 
those who were provided with a specific source of the delay, customers reported higher 
willingness to seek for more information when the blame was directed to the kitchen (4.51 vs. 
3.32; p = .005; see figure 2.4).  
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FIGURE 2.4 
WILLINGNESS TO SEEK FURTHER INFORMATION (STUDY 2) 
 
In general, customers seemed to take the waitperson’s communication as valid 
information when it contained definitive information about the source. This might suggest that 
evasive responses are more likely to be perceived as a violation of communication norms of 
informativeness and truthfulness (Grice, 1989). As a consequence, customers are (i) more likely 
to search for additional information about the source of their inconveniences, and also (ii) more 
likely to reduce tip amount as an expression of their unsatisfactory outcome of the ‘conversation.’ 
Phase 2 
Changes in the tip amount. The final dependent measure was intended to capture whether 
customers would modify their willingness to provide tip when they find out the manner in which 
the waitperson communicated with them was in fact not truthful. For each participant, I obtained 
a difference score for the tip amounts by subtracting the original tip amount from the final tip 
amount they indicated to leave. The three original responses by the waitperson were crossed with 
the two true sources of the delay (i.e., kitchen and waitperson), resulting in 6 experimental 
conditions for analysis.  
In particular, customers significantly reduced the tip amount by 5.29% of the total food 
bill when they found out that the waiter had blamed the kitchen for his/her own fault (i.e., self-
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interested lie). Similarly, when the underlying motive of the waitperson’s non-answer was 
proven to be self-serving, participants reduced the tip amount by 3.65%. On the contrary, when it 
was known to the customers that the waitperson was either lying or being evasive so as to cover 
up for the kitchen’s fault, they were willing to better compensate the waitperson by increasing 
the tip amount (by 3.89% or 3.28%, respectively). These results suggest that customers were 
willing to reward other-benefitting intentions of the servers albeit their non-truthfulness, but 
punish if those non-truthful maneuvers were in pursuit of self-interest (deception: 3.89 vs. -5.29, 
p < .001; evasion: 3.28 vs. -3.65, p < .001). The extent to which the customers change their tip 
amounts for the responses that were truthful in the first place fell in between how they reward the 
other-benefitting deception/evasion and how they punish the self-serving lies or evasive 
behaviors. They indicated to only moderately increase the tip (2%) when they were confirmed 
that it was not the waitperson’s fault, but verification of the waitperson’s truthful admission of 
one’s own fault did not result in any increase in the compensation (0.39%; 2 vs .39, p = .06; .39 
vs. 0, ns). 
FIGURE 2.5 
CHANGES IN TIP AMOUNT AFTER MANAGER’S CLARIFICATION (STUDY 2) 
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This latter part of study 2 provides insights on if and how information sharing falling 
short of authentic and truthful communication may be evaluated not only negatively but also 
positively by the audience, depending on the underlying motive. In particular, we showed that 
non-truthful communication may be penalized when it was intended to serve one’s own interest, 
but the non-truthful communication can be redeemed and justified when it was done for other’s 
benefits. In other words, the audience (i.e., customer) rewarded the information presenter, despite 
the information’s non-truthfulness, only when the non-truthful information was provided in the 
interest of others. This might serve as suggestive evidence that there could be a hierarchy among 
different dimensions of morality (which rewards unselfishness over truthfulness), at least in this 
context.  
In the section that follows, an integrative discussion of the results is attempted, while 
seeking to provide practical implications to interpersonal interactions in various consumption 
settings. 
 
2.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, two pilot studies were conducted in attempts to demonstrate the pattern of 
real communications that take place at restaurants between servers and customers. Additionally, 
three laboratory studies were conducted to examine antecedents and consequences of non-
truthful information managing in a more controlled setting, through which we found a consistent 
pattern of responses. When service providers (i.e., waitpersons in this context) were dealing with 
information about customer inconvenience, being evasive was the most preferred communication 
tactic used overall. While they tended to be evasive when the unfavorable situation was caused 
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by a third party (i.e., kitchen), they were as highly as or more likely to admit their own fault to 
customers.  
However, the tendency to admit one’s own fault diminished when the financial stakes 
were more directly involved with the interaction. This seems to signal that the servers were in 
part fighting with the drive to resort from normatively appropriate behavior to maximize one’s 
financial incentive. Evasion might deem itself as a viable option that would not necessarily hurt 
one’s moral self-view (Mazar et al. 2008) nor jeopardize their economic outcome from the 
interaction, to those who originally wanted to take responsibility in the mishap, and this might 
account for the prevalence of evasion in the self-fault condition in general. With such a 
conjecture that this reduction in the truth-telling tendency was based on the strategic motive to 
maximize the socio-economic outcomes, we, therefore, examined whether the choice of 
communication tactic driven by such motives would serve the communicators right.  
Using tip amounts as representations of customer reactions in study 2, I showed that 
customers respond less favorably at the tactic(s) most frequently chosen by the service providers. 
While evasion tends to be often preferred maneuver of communicating unfavorable information, 
customers do not seem to be satisfied with the manner in which the information is presented. 
Consequently, customers who were involved in an evasive communications indicated that they 
would leave the least amount of tip on average. Also, those customers were more likely to search 
for additional information had they been involved in evasive communications.  
Lastly, further downstream consequences in the event that the customers were provided 
with truthful information were inspected. Specifically, when additionally acquired information 
revealed the fact that the service providers had engaged in non-truthful tactics, customers 
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punished only the self-interested non-truthful behaviors but rewarded the those behaviors 
committed in the interest of other party (i.e., kitchen).  
Taking these findings from all the studies together, there seems to exist a paradox. The 
most favored options of the presenters did not result in the audience reactions that would 
maximize their financial stakes. In particular, servers were more likely to (1) be evasive or 
truthful about their own fault or (2) become evasive when it comes to communications about the 
kitchen’s fault. However, these popular responses did not always turn over to the most favorable 
economic outcomes. According to the customers, these behavioral tactics prompt significantly 
lesser tip than what the servers can receive otherwise, if they take an alternative approach of (1) 
blaming the kitchen instead of truthful admission of their own fault or (2) being truthful and 
explicit when it comes to communicating the kitchen’s fault.  
Nonetheless, a fairly high level of reported intentions of engaging in further information 
search reported by customers might suggest ways in which the paradox could be at least partially 
resolved. By investigating how participants react when another party verifies the non-truthful 
information, we can revisit the less beneficial consequences of the most favored response 
tactic(s). Given that there is a chance that the actual information comes available for the 
customers, to avoid telling the truth about the kitchen’s fault is not a terribly mistaken approach, 
as customers tend to reimburse for the well-intentioned evasion. Similarly, although being 
truthful about one’s own mistake does not necessarily get commended by higher incentives in the 
first place, it is better off than getting caught in deception or evasion about one’s own fault, as 
those self-interested lying or evasion are penalized by customers (study 2; phase 2). Therefore, 
the presenter’s paradox is not as severe as it seems, only with the potential of actual information 
being provided for the audience. 
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Overall, current findings suggest a boundary condition to generally preferable outcomes 
of employing evasion over deception, such that social consequences of evasion may be less 
favorable. This boundary condition was examined in a particular context where the evaluation of 
the information managing involved financial stakes. It would be worthwhile to examine if this 
condition applies to contexts that are associated with compensation mechanisms other than 
monetary incentives (e.g., moral judgments of others).  
A noteworthy pattern that emerged throughout the studies was that the majority of servers 
were loyal to the kitchen staff. Even when kitchen was responsible for the mishap, the servers 
stayed silent about the fact that the kitchen staff had caused the inconvenience to the customer, 
even though it turned out to be at the expense of their opportunities to maximize one’s financial 
return. Likewise, whereas some self-interested individuals might argue that there is a room to 
falsely blame the kitchen to present oneself in a favorable light when the mishap was caused by 
one’s own mistake, the servers in the population were reluctant to take advantage of the kitchen. 
Potential theorizing attempts for such loyal behaviors toward kitchen are suggested here: 
• This could be a hierarchy effect within the restaurant staff members in terms their 
relative standings. If the waitperson perceives kitchen to be higher in the hierarchy, 
the observed pattern of behavior might be explained by ‘loyalty towards 
superordinate’; if the waitperson perceives kitchen to be lower in the hierarchy, the 
pattern of behavior might be thought of as ‘taking care/responsibility of subordinate.’ 
• They might actually feel a shared responsibility for the mistake to solely blame the 
kitchen. When restaurant employees get trained to keep in mind that there is a 
common, singular goal to provide “best possible customer service,” the mere fact that 
customer(s) were inconvenienced might make them feel at least partially responsible. 
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• They might care about the kitchen’s reputation. They might think that ruining the 
reputation of the kitchen could be more damaging down the road, as the kitchen is the 
primary source from which the product is made. 
• Similarly, they might be cognizant about the fact that there rarely is a room or direct 
opportunities for the kitchen to make up for the mistake or provide justification or 
excuse themselves. 
• They might be simply afraid that customer might see them just to be ‘blaming’ the 
other party by default. 
Most of these theorizing attempts are closely related to the recent literature on social 
preferences (see Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) that proposes a 
variety of ways that people might care about social outcomes and not just private outcomes, but 
whether any (or the combination) of these would actually be at work is an empirical question. 
Future studies should also investigate the impact of non-truthful communication on 
recipient responses, particularly when the response to the communication involves financial 
transaction. Assuming that the general unfavorability towards evasive communication holds, a 
consumer might be paying more for wrong information over uncertain information. While the 
recipient of evasive communication may be motivated to seek additional information until he/she 
finds a definitive answer, it is highly likely that the word-of-mouth information that this 
consumer generates would be in a form of “gossip.” Negative consequences associated with 
gossiping behavior may be worthwhile to be discussed in the future research. 
Moreover, the findings regarding less favorable reactions toward evasive responding can 
be compared with Langer and her colleagues (1978)’ demonstration of the importance of 
providing a reason, even a ‘placebic’ one. In a field study of compliance, they found out the 
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requests that were accompanied by either a valid or a “placebic” reason were more successful 
than when no reason was provided. While individuals rejected statements that had the form of an 
unqualified request, they accepted almost any statement that had the general form of an 
explanation, showing that a statement with explanations are perceived better by the audience. In 
pilot study A, from the recall of actual server experiences, we observe that a number of servers 
went about the customer inconvenience by presenting ‘placebic’ information to the customer, 
consistent with Langer’s findings. However, when participants were asked to imagine 
themselves as servers, they seem to not understand the potential benefits of providing a 
seemingly irrelevant excuse to the customers (see Footnote 2, study 1A). Or, it may be a function 
of the rather subtle customer inconvenience that did not motivate restaurant servers in the study 
enough to engage in providing ‘placebic’ information to the customer.  
Moving forward, although this chapter is primarily intended to examine social outcomes 
of non-truthful communication tactics, it is worthwhile to consider the emotional experiences of 
the self-presenter (i.e., waitperson) throughout the course of interaction with the customer. In 
Chapter 1, I have shown that anticipated embarrassment serves as a common driver for deceptive 
and evasive communications among consumers, but the two tactics result in experiencing 
different levels of negative moral emotions, namely guilt and shame. The waitperson – customer 
interaction might entail similar emotional experiences as the self-presenter, but a different 
psychological mechanism might be at work as the monetary stakes are involved in the interaction.  
In conclusion, this chapter shows that while evasion is distinctively preferred way of 
managing an inconvenient truth in a social interaction, how it is regarded in the eye of the 
beholder may not be so preferable. Careful consideration of (unexpected or undesired) 
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downstream consequences would be helpful in making a wiser choice with regards to how to 
manage the flow of information within social interaction.  
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CONCLUSION 
Although a large body of research documents the use of outright deception to avoid 
disclosures of unflattering personal information, there has been scant empirical consideration that 
people might employ a less costly means to a similar end. Evasive communications are prevalent 
in a wide range of social interactions, where individuals are faced with a demand of unwanted 
disclosure of information. For example, a consumer might not want to disclose information about 
their recent consumption in the word-of-mouth context. A salesperson, who has attempted to 
allure a customer to purchase a product, would not wish to let the customer know that he or she 
does not have an answer to the question that the customer had just asked. In the tradition of 
recent efforts to address the paucity in the literature, the two chapters in this dissertation 
investigates evasion as a viable, often preferred alternative to deception. These chapters have 
revealed that evasion and deception are distinct response tactics that uniquely operate to different 
situational factors with unique emotional and socio-economic consequences. The present 
research provides a foundational exploration of the use of evasion as a more preferred response 
to social predicaments over deception. 
Chapter 1 revealed that evasion is a more likely response than deception, whether using 
self-reported intentions or observations of real behavior, and given consumer-to-consumer 
communications about price information or credit scores. We found empirical support for 
psychological distinction in these behaviors, that people who engaged in deception felt more 
guilt and shame than did their counterparts who were either evasive or told the truth. Further 
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evidence of discriminant validity for the two behaviors was provided by showing that evasion 
and deception are impacted by different contextual moderators. Deception (but not evasion) 
intentions declined with the risk of being discredited by an interaction partner, while evasion (but 
not deception) intentions decreased as a function of the persistence of a fellow consumer. 
Chapter 2 investigated the dynamic between communicator and recipient of the two non-truthful 
communication tactics. Specifically, two factors that are relevant to self-focus of self-
presentation were considered: (i) how motives to protect self vs. other might influence the self-
presentation and the veracity of it, and (ii) how the incentive structure can shape this self-
presentation. While communicators seemed to be conflicted between the choices of admission 
and evasion when they were to communicate about one’s own fault, they were reluctant to be in 
the position of blaming other party and evaded about the other party’s fault. However, an 
exploration of the recipient’s responses to the communication reveals that the most favored 
option by the communicator (i.e., evasion) is not necessarily favored by the recipient, thus often 
resulting in less satisfactory outcome. That is, while engaging in evasion has many benefits over 
deception, such as protecting oneself from getting exposed of potentially embarrassing 
information without feeling too much guilt and shame, it may or may not lead to achieving one’s 
goal in a social interaction.  
Taken together, the present dissertation sought to demonstrate the process of engaging in 
evasion within a social interaction that requires an effective self-presentation, by investigating 
psychosocial antecedents and consequences of evasion. Future research should continue to 
elucidate the conditions under which evasion might be an effective self-presentation tactic, yet 
recognize its caveats to further investigate ways to help restore more truthful and genuine 
communication within individuals. 
-- 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1A 
CHAPTER 1 STUDY 1A SCENARIO 
 
[Disparity = Yes / Disparity = No] Condition, Male Version 
 
Imagine that you are sitting poolside at a resort hotel. While sipping an iced tea, 
you have a pleasant conversation with Victor, a guest you met earlier that 
afternoon. You talk about fabulous amenities and excellent service at the hotel 
and you think about how you paid $1000 for 4 nights. The following conversation 
ensues: 
 
Victor: "So {first name}, how long are you here?" 
 
You: "Just for the weekend. I got here on Thursday and I'm leaving 
Monday morning." 
 
Victor: "Me too. We have the exact same schedule! I'm on the 16th floor 
with a lakeside view. What floor are you on?" 
 
You: "I'm on the 16th floor too, also with the lakeside view. Isn't it great?" 
 
Victor: "Absolutely! I paid $[800 / 1000] for 4 nights. What about you?" 
 
How are you likely to respond to Victor's question?  
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APPENDIX 1B 
CHAPTER 1 STUDY 2 SCENARIO 
 
Imagine that you have invited a handful of friends to your apartment to watch a 
movie on the new big-screen TV that you bought for $1,000. Before the movie 
starts, one of your friends notices that your new television is exactly the same 
brand, model, and size as the one (s)he bought a week ago. Then you and (s)he 
have the following conversation about television sets: 
  
Friend: "Nice TV. When did you get it?" 
 
You: "I got it on sale about a week ago." 
 
Friend: "Me too. I got the exact same set!" 
 
You: "Really?" 
 
Friend: "Yeah, I paid [Large Disparity = $700; Small Disparity = $900; No 
Disparity = $1,000]. What about you?" 
 
You: “_____________________________________________” 
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APPENDIX 1C 
CHAPTER 1 STUDY 3 SCENARIO 
 
[Low / High] Discreditability Condition, Female Version 
 
Imagine that you have invited a handful of friends to your apartment to watch a 
movie on the new big-screen TV that you bought for $1,000. One of your friends, 
Maria, arrives at your apartment a few minutes earlier than everyone else, so the 
two of you talk about the [features on / price you paid for] your new television 
while you wait for your other friends to arrive. Maria seems to be impressed when 
you tell her [about the 60-inch screen/ you paid $1,000 for it]. 
 
Soon, everyone arrives at your apartment and gathers around the television before 
you start the movie. Everyone is talking, when Jane looks at your TV and notices 
that it is exactly the same brand, model, and size as the one she bought a week 
ago. She suddenly blurts out, "Hey, I got the exact same set on sale last week for 
$800 at Best Buy, what about you?" 
 
How are you likely to respond to Jane's question? 
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APPENDIX 1D 
CHAPTER 1 STUDY 4 SCENARIO 
 
[Low / High] Persistence Condition, Male Version 
 
Imagine that you and some friends are meeting for lunch at the food court in the 
local mall. You and one of your friends, John, arrive a bit early to walk around the 
mall. The two of you stop at a kiosk for a credit card company that offers a free 
credit report for completing a credit application. After completing the application, 
each of you go to separate booths to see electronic copies of your credit reports. 
You privately learn that your FICO score of 610 is in the “low credit-worthiness” 
range. 
  
You and John then head to the food court to join your friends for lunch. While 
eating, you overhear a conversation between John and one of your mutual friends, 
Victor: 
  
John: “That history midterm was brutal. How did you do?” 
  
Victor: “I’ve been so busy this term, it’s been hard to study.” 
  
John: “I know what you mean. [So what did you do on the weekend? /So 
how did you do on the midterm?]” 
 
Victor: “I studied really hard for that exam." 
 
John: ["So what are you doing tonight? / So what was your mark?]” 
 
Victor: ["Well, I’m going to a movie. / Well, I got a C.]” 
 
John: “Me too. [Maybe we should go together! / Maybe we should study 
together!]” 
    
After listening to this conversation, you think to yourself, “That’s just like John... 
he’s [not very / so] persistent when he wants to know something. He [totally / 
totally didn't] let Victor avoid answering his question about his midterm mark.”  
  
John then mentions to everyone that the two of you just received your credit 
scores. He says, “I got a score of 775, which means I have “excellent credit-
worthiness.” Turning to you, he says, “What about you?” 
  
You are the only one who knows about your low credit score, and would be a 
little embarrassed if your friends found out that you have “low credit-worthiness.” 
How are you likely to respond to John's question?  
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APPENDIX 1E 
CHAPTER 1 EMOTION MEASURES 
 
1. Embarrassment 
a. Embarrassed, awkward, uncomfortable (S1B, S2) 
b. Embarrassed, self-conscious, blushing (Tangney et al. 2006; S1B, S3) 
 
2. Resentment: Resentful, malicious, animosity (S3) 
 
3. Depressive affect: Unhappy, distressed, dejected, awful (S3) 
 
4. Anger: Angry, irritated, annoyed (S3) 
 
5. Envy: Envious, jealous (S3) 
 
6. Shame: Ashamed, humiliated, disgraced (S1B, S3) 
 
7. Guilt: Repentant, guilty, blameworthy (S1B, S3) 
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APPENDIX 2A 
Classification schemes for responses (Chapter 2 Pilot A) 
 
Conditions 
Participants were asked to recall their experieneces as a server during which a customer 
inconvenience happened. 
There were 2 conditions: in one condition, participants themselves (who were working as 
servers at a restaurant) caused the inconvenience; in the other condition, they were to recall 
an incident where they had to deal with a customer inconvenience caused by other 
person/party 
 
Situation 
They were to describe what happened: please check if the description of the situation 
matches (or correctly reflects) the assigned condition 
 
Communication 
When condition = 1 (self) 
DV = 1 if participant apologizes and openly admits that it was "one's own fault" in the 
communication with the customer  
DV = 2 if participant apologizes but blame OTHER party (or claim that it's because of other 
person/party's fault) 
DV = 3 if participant apologizes without providing explanation about who caused the 
inconvenience, but with a less relevant excuse (e.g., busy day, 1st week at work) 
DV = 4 if participant apologizes without providing any explanation, but just says sorry 
When condition = 2 (other) 
DV = 1  if participant apologizes but says that the inconvenience was caused by OTHER 
party (or claim that it's because of other person/party's fault) 
DV = 2 if participant apologizes and says that it was one's own fault that caused the 
inconvenience 
DV = 3 if participant apologizes without providing explanation about who caused the 
inconvenience, but with a less relevant excuse (e.g., busy day, 1st week at work) 
DV = 4 if participant apologizes without providing any explanation, but just says sorry 
 
Other notes 
. If the steak was prepared not right, it could be the chef's fault that didn't prepare it the right 
way or the server's fault who did not clearly tell the chef. 
. Please judge by the situation whether it was the chef's or the server's fault and determine the 
coding for the communication. 
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APPENDIX 2B 
Scenario (Chapter 2 Study 1A) 
 
x 2-level ‘source of mistake’ factor: [Self-fault / Other-fault] conditions 
 
Imagine that you work on the wait staff of a local restaurant. You are paid an 
hourly wage plus 100% of the tips at your tables.  
  
 
On this particular day, there are a lot of guests in the restaurant, so you have been 
extremely busy. You discover that [you had / the kitchen] misplaced a food 
order for one of the customers from a party of 8 seated at one of your tables. The 
customer wanted sauce on the side for the meal, but [you forgot to tell the 
kitchen about/the kitchen forgot about your note regarding] the customer's 
request. 
 
When you were about to place the food order to the table, both you and the 
customer notice that the food order has the sauce on the food itself. The customer 
asks you: 
  
"Didn't I ask for the sauce on the side? 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2C 
Scenario (Chapter 2 Study 1B) 
 
2 x 2 between-subjects design 
x 2-level ‘source-of mistake’ factor: [Self-fault / Other-fault] conditions  
x 2-level ‘financial incentive structure’ factor: high vs. low (underlined phrase added 
for low condition) 
 
Imagine that you work on the wait staff of a local restaurant. You are paid an 
hourly wage plus 100% of the tips at your tables with an 18% gratuity 
automatically included for parties of 6 or more).   
On this particular day, there are a lot of guests in the restaurant, so you have been 
extremely busy. You discover that [you / the kitchen] misplaced a food order, 
causing a party of 8 seated at one of your tables to experience a 45-minute delay. 
Several customers seated at other tables around them already have received their 
meals, including some who arrived after the party of 8 placed their orders. 
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APPENDIX 2D 
Scenario (Chapter 2 Study 2) 
 
 
Imagine that you are dining at a local restaurant with a group of friends. As you wait for a 
waiter or waitress to take your order, you notice that there are a lot of guests in the 
restaurant. After you and your friends place your orders, a lot of time passes before you 
receive your meal. Meanwhile, you notice that many tables around you have already 
gotten their meals, including some that placed their orders after you did. After a 45-
minute delay, your waiter finally brings your food order. 
 
You ask your waiter:  
 
"What took so long?" 
 
The waiter answers: 
 
- (self) "I’m sorry for the delay. I accidentally mixed up your order. Thank you for your 
patience. Enjoy your meal.” 
 
- (kitchen) "I’m sorry for the delay. The kitchen staff accidentally mixed up your 
order. Thank you for your patience. Enjoy your meal.” 
 
- (no explanation) "I’m sorry for the delay. Thank you for your patience. Enjoy your 
meal.”  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
